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ABSTRACT 
The thesis, “Exploiting Weaknesses: An Approach to Counter Cartel Strategy,” provided 
an in-depth case study analysis of Los Zetas transnational criminal network to gain an 
understanding on its weaknesses and vulnerabilities.  The thesis utilized social movement 
theory to illuminate its mobilizing structure and key essential factors that make Los Zetas 
vulnerable to disruption.  In addition, the study identified Los Zetas’ financial support 
structure to expose its insidious methods. Finally, the thesis utilized social network 
analysis and geographical information systems to gain an understanding of its 
organizational networks, deduce possible safe havens, and key terrain of Los Zetas.  
Ultimately, the employment of the aforementioned theories revealed essential 
vulnerabilities, which form the essence of a practical disruption policy recommendation 
against Los Zetas. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mexico is currently experiencing a significant degree of violence that seems 
uncontrollable by the Mexican government. This level of violence is attributed to drug 
cartels wishing to control key terrain that support the illicit drug flow into the United 
States. The benefits of the drug trade have enabled these criminal organizations to 
accumulate an immense amount of wealth, which they use to build a robust internal 
defense mechanism to support their efforts to expand operations, challenge the state, and 
eliminate the competition. Arguably, the government of Mexico (GoM) has lost the 
ability to enforce the rule of law and provide public safety for its citizens.1 As a result, 
Mexico’s levels of violence continue to rise.  
The GoM has taken a direct approach to employ military means against drug 
cartels. The Mexican military and justice department have focused their resources to 
target cartel leadership in an effort to dismantle them. However, although the Mexican 
government has captured or killed a significant amount of cartel leaders, the result of this 
strategy has not reduced the level of violence. Furthermore, politicians, academics, and 
journalists criticize the current military strategy for being the problem and not the 
solution to the increased violence.2 
Recent studies suggest the war of attrition or the current GoM’s kingpin strategy 
employed will not reduce the level of violence that threatens the state.3 A common theme 
is that a more holistic approach is required to achieve the desire reduction in violence. 
Some analysts suggest that military capacity building, judicial reform, human rights 
education, and government institutional development can reduce the violence that 
presently exists in Mexico. However, absent in these studies are recommendations on 
how to defeat the most dangerous criminal organization in Mexico. Specifically, no 
                                                 
1 John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency,” Small Wars 
Journal (2009): 3, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/criminal-insurgencies-in-mexico. 
2 “Mexico Politics: Drug War Drags On—Latin America,” Economist, 2011, 
http://latinamerica.economist.com/news/mexico-politics-drug-war-drags/182. 
3 “Mexico Finds Killing Drug Kingpins Can Add to Mayhem,” Associated Press, 2010, 
http://gazettenet.com/2010/11/12/mexico-finds-killing-drug-kingpins-can-add-mayhem. 
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literature exists that provides a practical road map on how to defeat Los Zetas’ criminal 
organization or how to improve the current strategy employed by the Mexican military 
against Los Zetas. This thesis research intends to fill this void.  
This thesis argues that the persistent denial of essential resources (finances, key 
terrain, and organizational structure) to Los Zetas will decrease its operational capability 
and diminish its tactical functionality. To find an effective disruption strategy against Los 
Zetas, this research is focused on two questions. 
1. What are the key organizational components of Los Zetas? 
2. What are the vulnerabilities that undermine its operational capability? 
This thesis research draws on four main bodies of literature. The first provides a 
historical perspective of Los Zetas from inception to its present state. It also explains 
Mexico’s lack of security and inability to contain drug violence. Additionally, it provides 
a current picture of the criminal environment in Mexico, and the operational and tactical 
status of Los Zetas. This piece provides a closer look at some significant activities that 
shaped the drug war in Mexico. Ultimately, the bulk of this literature derives from 
journals, periodicals, and government reports injected into several analytical tools to 
show exploitable patterns of this insidious criminal organization.  
The second body of literature is social movement theory (SMT); in particular, the 
political process model and its emphasis on political opportunities, organizational 
resources, and insurgent consciousness. Most of the information on SMT is derived from 
the work of Doug McAdam4 and Sean Everton.5 For the purpose of this research, the 
focus is on analyzing the organizational resources of Los Zetas.  
The third body of literature focuses on social network analysis (SNA). The SNA 
concepts for the research are derived from the works of Sean Everton in the work entitled 
                                                 
4 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982).  
5 Sean Everton, “Social Movement Theory,” in Gangs & Guerrillas: Ideas from Counterinsurgency 
and Counterterrorism, ed. Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2011).  
  3 
Tracking, Destabilizing and Disrupting Dark Networks Using Social Network Analysis.6 
Everton’s work provides the SNA concepts that enable the visualization of Los Zetas’ 
criminal network, as well as help formulate a disruption strategy against their 
organizational structure.  
The fourth body of literature provides the foundation of the geospatial and 
temporal concepts. The thesis pulls from the works of Harm J. de Blij found in the book 
entitled, Why Geography Matters; Three Challenges Facing America; Climate Change, 
the Rise of China, and Global Terrorism.7 de Blij’s work provides the basic geospatial 
concepts that help describe the effects of the operational environment through analysis of 
terrain. Furthermore, the geographical analysis of Los Zetas’ key terrain will also draw 
from several academic projects including earlier analytical products of criminal 
organizations. This literature will provide the concepts of spatial, temporal and cluster 
analysis. Ultimately, the information derived from the literature provides a useful 
framework to examine the patterns of Los Zetas criminal activities. 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose for analyzing Los Zetas’ vulnerabilities is to facilitate the foundation 
for a practical disruption strategy. An examination of this criminal organization through 
SMT provides a useful starting point. SMT establishes that three factors must be present 
for an insurgency or social movement to emerge: political opportunities, increased 
organizational resources, and the development of a consciousness. The subsequent 
argument holds that these factors contribute to the formation and success of criminal 
organizations, such as Los Zetas. More importantly, the authors contend that the absence 
of Los Zetas’ organizational resources will create enough friction eventually to disrupt its 
operational capacity.  
                                                 
6 Sean F. Everton, Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks Using Social Network 
Analysis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
7 Harm J. de Blij, Why Geography Matters; Three Challenges Facing America; Climate Change, the 
Rise if China, and Global Terrorism (New York: Oxford Press, 2005). 
  4 
B. THESIS METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The first phase of this thesis provides an in-depth case study analysis of Los Zetas 
criminal organization through the lens of SMT and attempts to illuminate key essential 
factors that make them vulnerable to disruption. The research concentrates on identifying 
essential elements of the mobilizing structure of Los Zetas, which is one key factor of the 
SMT. The second phase examines Los Zetas’ financial support structure to expose its 
methods. Next, this thesis employs geographical information systems (GIS) to explore 
operational hubs and key terrain of Los Zetas. Furthermore, SNA of Los Zetas is 
reviewed to examine its organizational structure. Finally, the last phase constitutes the 
development of a pragmatic disruption strategy against the financial practices, key terrain 
and network infrastructure of Los Zetas, which is based on the findings of the 
aforementioned disciplines. As such, the thesis proceeds as follows. 
Chapter I presents an overview of the current violence campaign in Mexico. It 
briefly discusses the GoM’s current counter cartel strategy results and highlights Los 
Zetas’ significance within Mexico’s criminal underworld. It sets forth the primary 
questions for the research and draws boundaries of the study. It concludes with a 
discussion of the methodology for the research and includes the organization for the 
thesis.  
Chapter II analyzes Los Zetas in its historical context and highlights its prominent 
characteristics. It begins with the origin of Los Zetas by examining key political events 
that shifted the balance of power among dominant drug cartels. Next, it reviews the 
disruption of the former relationship between criminal organizations and the Mexican 
government. This chapter then explores the military heritage drawn from Mexican 
Special Forces (GAFE) deserters and its current affiliation to Guatemala’s Kaibiles. It 
also studies the robust organizational structure by discussing aspects of its design and 
highlighting the brutal operational methodology that sets Los Zetas apart from other 
criminal entities. Finally, it concludes with contemporary operational events and provides 
a preliminary snapshot of Los Zetas.  
  5 
Chapter III provides the conceptual framework of the study. This chapter explains 
in depth how Los Zetas can be viewed through the lens of SMT to explain its emergence, 
growth, and success. The main idea is to explain that ultimately Los Zetas requires 
resources (finances, key terrain, and personnel) to succeed and collapses without them.  
Chapter IV discusses the financial aspects of Los Zetas. It illuminates the major 
sources used to generate funds to support its operations. This chapter also examines 
unconventional illicit financial practices of the group. It concludes with highlights of 
existing counter methods by both U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies to reduce 
illicit financial activities. 
Chapter V uses GIS to identify key terrain that Los Zetas requires to operate. By 
conducting a retroactive examination of criminal incidents in Los Zetas’ operational 
terrain, the research identifies operational patterns used to accomplish its goals. Lastly, 
this chapter identifies points of vulnerabilities in specific operational areas that contribute 
to the overall disruption strategy.  
Chapter VI employs SNA tools (Palantir, UCINET, and Organizational risk 
analyzer (ORA)) to illuminate the organizational structure of Los Zetas. The intent is to 
understand the network and examine the operational ties and affiliations that Los Zetas 
needs to succeed. The focus is to identify key individuals who if removed will greatly 
incapacitate the operational effectiveness of the organization. This chapter discusses the 
value and applicability of using SNA to study criminal networks, such as Los Zetas. 
Chapter VII offers concluding thoughts on the overall view of Los Zetas. It then 
makes practical recommendations to disrupt the organization based on the exploration of 
financial practices, geospatial analysis and findings in SNA. Finally, it concludes with 
other recommended areas of research.  
  6 
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Americans’ insatiable appetite for illegal drugs has long been viewed as a threat 
to national security. This view began in 1971 with former President Richard Nixon who 
took an essential step toward militarization by coining the term “war on drugs.”8 As a 
result, for over four decades, the United States has aggressively countered the supply side 
of the drug market, which has yielded insignificant results. Today, both the United States 
and Mexico are still confronting an uncontrollable flow of illegal drugs that fuel the level 
of violence on both sides of the border. As drugs continue to flow north and money 
moves south, opportunistic drug cartels have evolved into private lethal armies. 
Ultimately, these violent syndicates create a significant threat to a country’s internal 
security, national interests, and its citizens. In response to this increasing threat, President 
Calderón of Mexico has committed 50,000 troops to combat the various criminal 
organizations head on; nevertheless, drug cartels remain resilient and immune to 
governmental and competitors’ counter efforts. In the end, the convergence of the current 
Mexican government counter cartel strategy and the relentless response of the drug 
cartels to remain in business, have yielded an estimated body count of 50,000 with 
seemingly no end to the violence in the near future. 
Los Zetas has emerged as one of the most prominent, dangerous, and resilient 
cartels in Mexico. This criminal syndicate continues to adapt to a dynamic and violent 
environment successfully to achieve its end. Los Zetas’ goal consists of generating 
financial capital through any means possible. The methods required to maximize Los 
Zetas’ profits require a perpetual aggressive and hostile campaign to control the 
environment. Los Zetas achieves its goals by collecting illicit profits from the trafficking 
of drugs and humans, prostitution, theft, counterfeiting, kidnappings, and extortion. 
                                                 
8 Lucia Graves, “On 40th Anniversary of War on Drugs, Cops Decry Obama's Drug Policy,” 
Huffington Post, August 15, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/15/40-anniversary-war-on-
drugs-cops-obama_n_877702.html. 
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Ultimately, Los Zetas successfully controls territory, expands its market reach, and 
generates sufficient revenue to continue its successful existence. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine Los Zetas’ origins and physical infrastructure to gain a deeper 
understanding of what factors separate Los Zetas from its competitors and what 
conditions facilitate its operational success. 
B. ORIGIN 
Critics of the war on drugs attribute the increased violence in Mexico to the 
current counter cartel strategy, which originated 11 years ago with the administration of 
Vicente Fox and has intensified with the administration of Felipe Calderón.9 Prior to 
Fox’s presidency, a mutual agreement between drug cartels and the government existed 
that provided sanctuary and protection to major drug cartels in exchange for profit. Once 
this criminal relationship was disrupted, ‘lex talionis’ swayed drug cartels to create their 
own private armies for protection, which in turn, has given rise to the most brutal, 
resilient, and successful criminal entity, Los Zetas.10  
Initially, Los Zetas was comprised of Mexican Special Forces deserters who 
joined the military arm of the Gulf Cartel (CDG) to provide route security, eliminate the 
competition, provide personal protection, and collect debts. Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, the 
now-jailed leader of the CDG, is responsible for recruiting Los Zetas’ current leadership. 
He was able to lure members of the Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE) 
with lucrative salaries and the opportunity to increase profits in the future. In return, 
Cardenas Guillén was able to advance his criminal organization with his newly created 
military arm, Los Zetas.  
A deeper exploration of the GAFE military unit provides some insight into the 
tactical capabilities that shaped the original Zetas, and explains the unparalleled 
advantage that this criminal syndicate has over other criminal competitors. GAFE is a 
special unit of the Special Forces branch, which was initially created in 1986 as the 
                                                 
9 Max G. Manwaring, “A “New” Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The 
Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies,” Strategic Studies Institute (2009): 17. 
10 Ibid., 17–18. 
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“Fuerza de Intervención Rápida” (Rapid Intervention Force), to provide security for the 
Soccer World Cup in Mexico City. Subsequently, France's National Gendarmerie 
Intervention Group (GIGN) trained the group in special weapons and counter-terrorism 
tactics.11 In 1998, GAFE saw action fighting the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
(EZLN) guerrillas in Chiapas.12 At some point during this time, the 7th Special Forces 
Group based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, trained some members of the elite GAFE. 
“They were given map reading courses, communications, standard Special Forces 
training, light to heavy weapons, machine guns and automatic weapons,” said Craig 
Deare, the former Special Forces commander, who is now a professor at the U.S. 
National Defense University. “I had some visibility on what was happening, because this 
[issue] was related to things I was doing in the Pentagon in the 1990s.”13 Many consider 
GAFE units the Mexican equivalent to the United States Army Special Forces (Green 
Berets).  
Several GAFE members, following completion of the U.S. training, deserted the 
Mexican military and were later led by former lieutenant Arturo Guzmán Decena to 
create the military action arm of the Gulf Cartel. Their desertion, followed by the 
transition to Los Zetas, first came to the attention of Mexico's Attorney General's office 
in 1999. More defections occurred in the following years; between the years 2000 and 
2005, over 1,300 more of these elite soldiers deserted. The GAFE desertion rate of 25% 
towers over any other branch of the Mexican military.14 As a result, Gerardo Clemente 
Ricardo Vega García, then secretary of the national defense, ordered changes in the 
GAFE organizational structure to unify the control of the elite military unit and prevent 
future desertions. In any case, GAFE still managed to survive after the desertion  
 
 
                                                 
11 Ejército de México, http://www.fuerzasmilitares.org/phase_two/index.php?topic=1316.0;wap2.  
12 México Armado, November 14, 2007, http://www.mexicoarmado.com/temas-generales-y-
humor/90881-grupos-aeromoviles-de-fuerzas-especiales-gafes.html. 
13 Chris Arsenault, “U.S.-Trained Cartel Terrorises Mexico,” Infowars Ireland, October 22, 2010, 
http://info-wars.org/2010/10/22/us-trained-cartel-terrorises-mexico/. 
14 Todd Miller, “Mexico: Corporate Hit Men Find New Ways to Turn a Profit,” North American 
Congress on Latin America, January 20, 2010, https://nacla.org/node/6369. 
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experienced within its ranks. To its credit, some of the significant accomplishments post-
desertion include the capture of several notorious drug kingpins, such as Benjamin 
Arellano Felix and Osiel Cárdenas Guillén from the CDG.  
Not surprisingly, Los Zetas quickly established itself as a professional lethal force 
that accomplished tasks with brutal and unmatched precision. Ultimately, what brought 
these individuals together to succeed was the desire to make money. Due to its 
operational efficiency, Los Zetas won the trust of the cartel’s leadership and gained 
access to the drug business. As a result of the ongoing GoM offensive operations against 
the CDG, its top leader, Cardenas Guillén, was arrested. Guillén’s arrest created a 
window of opportunity for Los Zetas to gain sufficient autonomy to operate on its own, 
which took a more active leadership role in drug trafficking with the CDG under the 
name “the Company.” The Company was short lived after the CDG killed a close 
associate to Los Zetas leadership, and ultimately, an all out war ensued. Consequently, as 
Los Zetas began to operate in the drug business, it changed its composition, purpose, and 
structure. Los Zetas shifted from simply being the action arm of the Gulf Cartel and 
making mediocre profits to leaping aggressively into the drug business and making 
massive amounts of revenue. Concurrently, the criminal syndicate adjusted its 
organizational structure to adapt to the dynamic environment of the drug trade. In the 
end, Los Zetas took advantage of a resource that most other cartels lacked—advanced 
military training. Soon, it had procured a full spectrum of contacts, both indigenous and 
international, and used military skill to optimize its flourishing drug business.  
C. STRUCTURE 
Los Zetas’ structure displays both centralized and decentralized dimensions in its 
design as depicted in Figure 1.15 Heriberto Lazcano is the top leader of Los Zetas; he is 
one of its original members and his span of control is limitless, such as the expansion of 
operational reach inside and outside of Mexico or approving affiliation with sister cartels. 
                                                 
15 It is important to note that any description of Los Zetas described in this thesis only represents a 
snapshot in time. Specifically, the current hostile environment continuously forces changes against its 
organizational structure. Hence, the true structure and total membership of Los Zetas is almost impossible 
to pinpoint.  
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He has armed security and support rings consisting of lawyers and accountants at his 
disposal. Ultimately, Lazcano provides a sense of order and structure to Los Zetas, but 
the daily decision-making process is decentralized down to a subordinate lieutenant, and 
most tactical moves are driven from the bottom up, although the initial vision and goals 
derive from the top.  
  12 
 
Figure 1.   Los Zetas Organizational Structure 
  13 
Two sub-commanders or confidants are present within the command and control 
element. The second person in charge runs the operations in Nuevo Laredo and the third 
person in charge runs operations in several states to the east and south of Nuevo Laredo. 
Financiers collect all tariffs from all locations. More than 15 mid-level managers 
comprise below the third in command, which consist of principal lieutenants who run 
their respective locations. Below each of the principal lieutenants are enforcers charged 
with the protection of personnel, drugs, transportation, or any other offensive operations, 
such as assassinations, ambushes, torture, kidnappings, and breaking-out cartel members 
from prison. Within the span of control of the mid-level management, a robust 
intelligence network also exists composed of prostitutes, gangs, lookouts, informants, and 
connections to local police and municipal politicians. Los Zetas has assumed a 
decentralized management style, which is based on cellular entities each with distinct 
divisions of labor. These cells remain compartmentalized but periodically collaborate 
with each other. At this level, enough redundancy occurs that allows commanders of key 
terrain (i.e., plazas and major roads) to synchronize operations.  
Another important factor providing Los Zetas its flexibility and resiliency is 
secrecy. The secrecy of the organization is molded in the way it is organized, part 
hierarchy, part decentralized, which allows Los Zetas to project force and maximize 
profits. For example, the capture of a plaza boss will not endanger the livelihood of 
Lazcano because of Los Zetas’ compartmentalized structure. Los Zetas’ often-
surreptitious nature has caused rival cartels to hang narco-mantas (narco-banners), calling 
on Heriberto Lazcano to “fight like a man.”16 
D. FINANCE LOGISTICS AND OPERATIONS 
Generating revenue is Los Zetas’ main goal; the main source of generating money 
is centered on the drug business. Therefore, it is important for Los Zetas to have a robust 
logistical mechanism that ensures monetary exchange and the delivery of illegal drugs 
from point of origin to the end user. Accordingly, Los Zetas maintains a flexible and 
                                                 
16 “Aparecen Nacomantas Contra El Lazca Varios Estados,” Tribuna Delicias, February 4, 2011, 
http://www.tribunadelicias.com/2011/02/aparecen-narcomantas-contra-el-lazca.html. 
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innovative support infrastructure to move drugs into the United States, as well as a 
consistent cash flow back into Mexico. Three major phases of the drug business help 
illustrate the extensive support mechanism that Los Zetas has developed to be successful 
in the drug business. The first consists of drugs that originate in South America and arrive 
into areas of Panama and Guatemala where Los Zetas moves operations and controls key 
terrain. Drug shipments arrive at these locations by air, land, or sea and the criminal 
organization then takes possession. In the second phase, the drugs are then shipped by 
road or rail into Mexico and injected into the corridor currently dominated by Los Zetas, 
namely, from the southeastern part of Mexico to its northern border near Nuevo Laredo 
(see Figure 2). The third phase begins when the shipments reach Nuevo Laredo, which 
are then divided into smaller bundles passed across the border and into the hands of U.S. 
gangs affiliated with Los Zetas. Finally, with the same cautionary practice by which the 
drugs are moved north, the same methods are used to move money and weapons south. 
Ultimately, it is important for Los Zetas to continue this business process to continue 
operations. 
 
Figure 2.   Los Zetas current strongholds 
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Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have become valuable terrain for Los 
Zetas to conduct operations. Guatemala, for instance, serves as a reception hub for illegal 
narcotics in which Los Zetas and associates have built clandestine airstrips, safe houses, 
and warehouses to smuggle drugs, weapons, profits and humans. In addition, in 2009, 
evidence emerged that Los Zetas was attempting to leverage access into the Guatemalan 
Central bank. Honduras Police Director José Muñoz, who has collectively confiscated 
nearly 12,400 kilograms of cocaine so far this year, calls Los Zetas a monumental 
adversary that “no nation can take on by itself.”17 El Salvador’s abundance of weapons 
and use of the U.S. dollar may make it an easy place to launder drug money; large 
amounts of cash and the discovery of a purported Zeta training camp near Guazapa have 
added to fears of a new battleground.18 Ultimately, places like Guatemala, Honduras, and 
El Salvador are of increasing strategic value for Los Zetas. Some analysts attribute the 
shift in operations to the ongoing military strategy against drug cartels in Mexico.19 
Undoubtedly, drug warfare is taking a toll on innocent lives and becoming an 
irritant to Mexico’s national economy. Even though the Calderón administration 
unleashed the most aggressive counter cartel strategy in Mexican history, Los Zetas has 
adapted by developing an increasingly diverse set of fund-raising activities, such as 
kidnappings, murder-for-hire, assassinations, extortion, money laundering, and human 
smuggling. Los Zetas appears very much like a global business organization with 
associates creating market strongholds that can respond to nearly any opportunity, 
challenge, or dynamic environment rapidly and effectively.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Iris Amador, “Los Zetas Sows Fear While Expanding Reach Throughout Central America,” 
Diálogo, October 17, 2011, http://dialogo-
americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2011/10/17/los-zetas-in-honduras.  
18 Voicesfromelsalvador, “Los Zetas in El Salvador: Is There a New Gang in Town?” Voices from El 
Salvador, June 30, 2011, http://voiceselsalvador.wordpress.com/2011/06/30/los-zetas-in-el-salvador-is-
there-a-new-gang-in-town/.  
19 Ibid., 71. 
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From a logistics perspective, Los Zetas continues to expand its distribution reach, 
which has grown into a global network. Internally, it has assumed a paternalistic 
relationship with the people in its zone of operations to gain control, freedom of 
movement, and increase financial gains. Los Zetas controls key coastal areas, as well as 
the road networks that lead into the United States.  
Currently, six major cartels exist in Mexico. Los Zetas is not the largest cartel but 
it is certainly the most ruthless element in control of the drug routes along the U.S.-
Mexico border. Los Zetas are distinctive. Its territory is incredibly broad, which stretches 
from the Texas border all the way to Guatemala, and continues to expand. It has also 
developed its own network of affiliated cartels. In particular, it has worked closely with 
the Beltran Leyva Organization for gaining access to drug trade contacts in South 
America, and with the cartels of Juarez and Tijuana, to secure legal point of entries on the 
U.S.-Mexico border. Los Zetas also has developed ties with the Italian organized crime 
group NDrangheta for drug distribution purposes. It has also reached out to Guatemalan 
Kaibiles for operational assistance. Guatemalan Kaibiles are described as the most 
unrelenting special operations forces in Latin America, which Los Zetas uses for 
protection, assassinations, and any other work requiring extreme violence tactics. Within 
the state and municipal level government, Los Zetas is not short of affiliates to support its 
operational efforts. In areas in which Los Zetas dominate, the local police serve as 
extortionists, kidnappers, and hired assassins who are on Los Zetas’ payroll. Ultimately, 
the Mexican police are accused of protecting the drug cartels and making fiduciary 
agreements, which only impedes the federal authorities’ battle against the narcotic agents.  
E. OPERATIONAL TRENDS 
Los Zetas’ unlimited access to finances provides it with an unparalleled edge 
against its competitors and state forces. It is not unusual for municipal police to be 
outgunned by Los Zetas. Its weapons of choice include a wide range of military grade 
caliber assault rifles and grenade launchers. It will go to extensive efforts to maintain and 
regain territory. The killing of innocent people and collateral damage is unimportant. 
Furthermore, Los Zetas thrives on maintaining the street credibility of ruthless and 
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violent operators to impute fear in its opposition. Without remorse, torture and 
beheadings against its enemies seem like an everyday practice, which serves as an 
effective trademark of distinction for Los Zetas. 
F. LANDMARK EVENTS 
In early 2011, the death of a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
agent was attributed to Los Zetas.20 Reports state that the top leadership of Los Zetas 
never authorized the assassination of an ICE agent, which was later corroborated in an 
interview with ‘Z-7’, Jesus Enrique Rejon Aguilar, who is believed to be Los Zetas’ third 
ranking member.  
On another note, recent discoveries of several mass graves have been attributed to 
Los Zetas. On June 15, 2011, over 190 dead bodies were found in a mass grave near San 
Fernando in Mexico. Los Zetas controls a large portion of the human smuggling corridors 
in Mexico and is forcing illegal migrants through dissimulation and other coercive 
measures, such as working for it as transport mules and extorting money from them. 
Unfortunately, those who refuse to cooperate are killed and buried in mass graves.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Since its inception, Los Zetas has successfully evolved and adapted to an ever-
changing and violent environment. Considering the effort expended to attack the drug 
cartels in Mexico offensively, Los Zetas has gained status within Mexico’s criminal 
underworld. Although the increased offensive operations against drug cartels have 
afflicted significant damage on the group, it is difficult to determine the true disruption of 
the criminal organization. Unquestionably, this criminal organization continues to have 
access to unlimited resources that fund its growth and success. It also continues to gain 
safe space to expand its operational boundaries.  
                                                 
20 Borderland Beat Reporter Gerardo, “Jesús Enrique Rejón Aguilar, “el Mamito,” Is Captured,” 
Borderland Beat, July 4, 2011, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/07/jesus-enrique-rejon-aguilar-el-
mamito.html.  
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III. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Los Zetas has emerged as one of the most violent, efficient and successful 
criminal organizations in Mexico. Although the administration of President Calderon has 
employed the most effective and aggressive offensive against drug cartels in Mexican 
history, Los Zetas criminal organization continues to grow and accomplish its illicit 
activities. An explanation for this conundrum remains unanswered, and is consequently, 
the purpose of this chapter, which begins by attempting to analyze the effects of the 
Mexican government strategy and the response from the drug cartels. Collectively, the 
Mexican drug cartels’ fierce inter-rivalry and the Mexican government’s strategy, 
disrupted a long lasting culture of corruption that has contributed to the emergence of 
militant armed groups like Los Zetas. The counter cartel strategy in Mexico has been 
narrowly focused and concentrates on leadership targeting in an effort to decapitate drug 
cartels’ top leaders.21 Periodically, this strategy has yielded successes, such as the capture 
of the former Gulf cartel leader Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, but, inadvertently, it has also 
facilitated the strengthening of other crime syndicates akin to Los Zetas.  
In particular, the current strategy has neglected to take a more holistic approach to 
reducing violence and organized crime in Mexico. More importantly, it disregards the 
socio-economic conditions and political process that influence a sector of the population 
to engage in illicit behavior. Consequently, Los Zetas has been able to exploit these 
opportunities to its benefit. To gain a better understanding of Los Zetas’ resilience, this 
chapter draws on contemporary social movement theory to illuminate Los Zetas’ success 
story.  
                                                 
21 “Mexico Politics: Drug War Drags on-Latin America,” 
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B. ROAD MAP 
This chapter begins by presenting a framework that identifies Los Zetas as an 
applicable case study by using social movement theory. It discusses how Los Zetas at 
times resembles an insurgency more than it does a traditional criminal organization. The 
authors contend that Los Zetas closely resembles an insurgency in its tactics and 
methodology and also emphasizes the ideological differences that exist between insurgent 
movements and criminal organizations. The second portion of the chapter discusses how 
the political process model illuminates each of the necessary conditions for social 
movements and insurgencies to emerge, grow, and succeed. The chapter concludes with a 
condensed summary of the political process model as it applies to Los Zetas.  
C. LOS ZETAS: CRIMINAL INSURGENCY 
Since the arrest of the CDG leadership and its new association with rival cartels, 
Los Zetas has branched off into its own criminal enterprise while persistently 
undermining the state by establishing “zones of impunity” that attack the competition, 
and force rival cartels and law enforcement to adjust to the violent environment. 
Consequent to the increase in violence and lack of government presence in these zones, 
what increased was a diminished relationship between the population and state 
institutions charged with preserving the rule of law. Ultimately, Los Zetas has sought to 
gain the necessary freedom of action to increase its revenue, expand its territory, and 
protect its current operations. This dynamic presents a critical security challenge for 
Mexico.22 Arguably, the dynamic of Los Zetas manifests in its footprint as a 
nontraditional threat, and at times, mirrors the architecture of an insurgency.23 The 
intention is not to define Los Zetas as a traditional insurgency but to illuminate how the 
group’s ability to exploit political opportunities, generate population support, and 
capitalize on its unlimited access to resources is much like an insurgency. 
                                                 
22 Manwaring, “A “New” Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment,” 21. 
23 Robert J. Bunker, Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries (New York: Rutledge, 
2011), 57. 
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A close examination of the definition of an insurgency further clarifies the point 
that Los Zetas is not an insurgent group, but that it uses tactics and techniques similar to 
an organized armed group to achieve its goals. The Special Forces Unconventional 
Warfare manual defines an insurgency as, “An organized movement aimed at the 
overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”24 
Although this criminal organization uses violent tactics to achieve control of key terrain, 
subdue political entities, and manipulate the population in similar ways to insurgencies, 
the difference is that Los Zetas does not show any interest in overthrowing the current 
regime of Mexico.25 Los Zetas seeks political dominance, not to overthrow the current 
national government, but to attain freedom of movement and action. Interestingly, it 
seeks to do this at the state and municipal levels, but not at the federal level.26 With this 
in mind, based on the assumption that the organization operates similar to an irregular 
threat, it is important to shift from comparing ideology and tactics to exploring the factors 
and conditions that enabled Los Zetas’ existence.  
D. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY: POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL 
Los Zetas exploits several factors that have enabled its emergence, growth and 
success. These factors consist of shifting political opportunities, access to infinite amount 
of resources, and a glorified criminal appeal to a large number of the aggrieved 
population. To understand the aforementioned dynamics further, it is equally important to 
delve into the political process model.  
Historically, aggrieved groups that have desired change in the political 
environment have given birth to social movements. However, grievances alone are 
insufficient for the emergence of a social movement. In particular, it takes the expansion 
of political opportunities, access to sufficient resources, and the development of an 
                                                 
24 “Special Forces Unconventional Warfare training Circular (TC 18-01),” Department of the Army 
(January 2011): 1–2. 
25 Manwaring, “A “New” Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment,” 22–23. 
26 Ibid., 23. 
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insurgent consciousness for a social movement to emerge.27 The political process model 
holds that the existence of these factors alone cannot generate insurgency or social 
movement; however, the fusion of these factors generates the desired outcome.28  
E. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES  
For insurgencies to emerge, an expansion of political opportunities must exist. 
Political opportunities are open windows in the political environment created by the 
disruption of the existing political landscape. According to Doug McAdam, expanding 
political opportunities can be caused by wars, industrialization, international political 
realignments, poor socioeconomic conditions, widespread demographic changes, just to 
name a few.29 These events can shape the environment and offer the political openness 
necessary for insurgent movements to emerge. Political opportunities typically manifest 
themselves in three primary ways: political instability, shift of the political system, and 
the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.30 
For Mexico, poor socio-economic conditions provide a fertile ground for criminal 
activity to flourish and influence political instability. The business of illegal smuggling 
and the drug trade date back to the early decades of the 20th century. However, organized 
crime was never as violent as when Mexico became the main gateway for illegal drugs 
into the United States. A significant factor contributing to the disruption of its political 
environment was the strategic impact of the counter-drug trade operations in South 
America and the Caribbean in the mid and late 1990s.31 As U.S. efforts succeeded in 
toppling the Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia, the drug trade became more 
                                                 
27 Doug McAdam, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political, Opportunities, 
Mobilization Structures and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10. 
28 As cited in Anil Karaca, “Disrupting Terrorist Networks: An analysis of the PKK Terrorist 
Organization” (Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2010), 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/thesis/2010/dec/10Dec_karaca.pdf, 8. 
29 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 41. 
30 McAdam, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 2. 
31 Ed Vulliamy, Amexica: War Along the Borderline (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 28. 
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decentralized, which resulted in the creation of weaker and smaller cartels.32 
Concurrently, the continuous counter-drug pressures on the drug smuggling routes in the 
Caribbean created a balloon effect that shifted drug trafficking through Mexico.33 As a 
result, the strategic value of Mexico’s border with the United States increased, and South 
American cartels were forced to rely on Mexican criminal entities for their illicit 
operations. In response to the high trafficking demand, Mexican cartels no longer felt the 
need to serve as couriers for the Colombian cartels and changed the rules of the trade. 
Mexican cartels demanded compensation in product and not cash.34  
In sum, the impact of the U.S. counter-drug efforts in South America proved to be 
two-fold. First, it shifted the role of Mexican drug cartels in the drug trade and it 
increased the amount of illegal drugs flowing into the United States from Mexico. 
Second, as more drugs began to transit through Mexico, the competition among warring 
cartels increased. Ultimately, this dynamic had a traumatic effect on Mexico’s internal 
security. In response, the GoM was forced to divert resources to counter these threats.  
Adding to this shifting reality was the opening of the Mexican economy and the 
establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, which 
was intended to improve socio-economic conditions. Instead, it contributed to the 
expansion of political opportunities benefitting the drug trade. Although NAFTA 
provided some positive stimulus to the Mexican financial sectors, the same can be said 
about its influence on its dark economy. Interestingly, NAFTA made the ports of entry in 
Nuevo Laredo one of the most active commercial borders in the world. It is estimated that 
some 5,000 trucks cross north into Laredo daily.35 As much as 40% of the legal business 
that enters the United States from Mexico enters through Nuevo Laredo. Unfortunately, 
approximately 40% of the drugs entering the United States enter in the same fashion.36 
                                                 
32 Colleen Cook, “CRS Report for Congress: Mexican Drug Cartels,” October 16, 2007, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf. 
33 Vulliamy, Amexica: War Along the Borderline, 28. 
34 Ibid., 28–30. 
35 Ibid., 237. 
36 Ibid., 242. 
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Arguably, Nuevo Laredo has become the most prized plaza in Mexico.37 Once the gates 
into the United States were opened, it triggered three hostile fronts between the CDG, the 
Sinaloa cartel, and the Mexican security forces.38 The end result of NAFTA has been the 
creation of a precious business opportunity that fueled a latent security problem, which 
exacerbated the escalation of violence, ungoverned space and overall instability of the 
state. Therefore, Mexico’s capacity to stabilize the environment is challenged by the 
ongoing turf battles in this region of the country.  
Considered as the tipping point, the factor that expanded Los Zetas’ opportunities 
was the disruption of the established link between the government and drug cartels, 
which existed for over 70 years. The actions taken by the National Action Party (PAN) 
severed this relationship of corruption after the electoral defeat of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2000.39 Previously, under PRI rule, the government served 
as an intermediary institution between existing cartels, which allowed the cartels limited 
operational freedom through informal patronage of politicians and state institutions. Once 
the PAN came to power, Fox’s counter-drug strategy that consisted of dismantling drug 
cartel operations disrupted this relationship. This shift in strategy forced existing cartels 
to innovate and seek self-preservation tactics. As a result, this shift gave rise to drug 
cartels’ private armies, such as Los Zetas.40  
An additional significant factor contributing to political opportunities was the 
government’s inability to run its institutions. If the existing government provides a stable 
environment and runs the political infrastructure with effectiveness, then the 
opportunities for resistance groups or criminal entities diminish. Conversely, when the 
government fails to run its institutions effectively, it inadvertently fuels political 
instability. In the case of Mexico, President Fox’s counter-cartel strategy was negatively 
affected by a lack of institutional reforms for its security apparatus, which facilitated the 
                                                 
37 Vulliamy, Amexica: War Along the Borderline, 31. 
38 Ibid., 31, 33, 35. 
39 Manwaring, “A “New” Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment,” 21. 
40 Ibid., 17–18. 
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advancement of the criminal organization’s goals.41 The “plata o plomo” (silver or lead) 
tactic, used by the drug cartels, consisted of intimidating judges, politicians, policemen, 
and businessmen by giving them the choice between taking a bribe or a bullet.42 With its 
uninterrupted ability to amass finances and its employment of coercive tactics and violent 
techniques, Los Zetas managed to corrupt politicians, judges and policemen or executed 
them at will.43 Once the previous relationship between government and cartel was 
disrupted, the federal government’s inability to control corruption at the lower levels 
enabled the drug cartels and private enforcer groups to emerge. A concluding point here 
is that Fox should have reformed government institutions with the same intensity that he 
attacked drug cartels. Unfortunately, the existing government institutions were too 
corrupt, and failed to adjust to the abrupt change in strategy implemented by Fox. 
Political opportunities are also influenced by the state’s capacity and propensity 
for repression. The government’s ability to repress a movement negatively affects the 
expansion of political opportunities. McAdam cites various examples to illuminate this 
point and concludes that the reason for the success of these movements is in part due to 
the lack of capacity by the government to repress them.44  
The GoM’s response against organized crime is based on an entropic strategy that 
focuses on targeting cartel leadership. Security forces fail to realize that pursuing the 
sequential targeting of cartel leadership creates a power vacuum that only cultivates 
competition and escalation of violence.45 This response creates second and third-order 
effects that exacerbate the exact problem it intends to solve.  
                                                 
41 Bunker, Narcos Over the Border, 97. 
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45 Hatty Copeman, “Mexican Drug War Escalates. War on Drugs Is a Failed War Pushing Mexico into 
a Downward Spiral,” LatinAM/Caribbean Affairs, http://www.suite101.com/content/the-mexican-drug-
war-a172889. 
  26 
Although Fox’s administration showed some willingness to confront organized 
crime by disrupting the long lasting nexus between cartels and government, it failed to 
realize that it lacked the physical capacity to do much about it. The Mexican forces are ill 
equipped and poorly trained. The lack of opportunities in promotions and quality of life 
encourage a high level of desertion and renders the state forces almost incapable against 
well-armed cartels.46 In the end, the mediocre government’s response gave Los Zetas 
room to adapt and improve its organization.  
F. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
Historically, social movement theorists based most of their work on the 
assumption that the conditions necessary for movements to grow consists primarily of the 
existence of collective grievances. McCarthy and Zald did not completely dismiss the 
importance of grievances, but concluded that they were secondary in importance to 
resources.47 This section focuses on understanding how the availability of resources 
influences collective action to develop and how these factors apply to Los Zetas.  
Several incidents illuminate the significant increase in available resources that 
lured the initial cadre of Los Zetas into the criminal world. First, the CDG, under the 
control of Juan Garcia Abrego in the 1980s, switched from trafficking marijuana to 
smuggling cocaine.48 The high demand for drugs and access via the Nuevo Laredo plaza 
guaranteed his increased financial power. As a result, Garcia Abrego became the first 
drug dealer to make the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) ten most wanted list. 
After his extradition, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén took control of the CDG.49 Cardenas then 
sought the recruitment of military members to work for him. He successfully recruited 
Arturo Decena, who recruited an unknown number of former and active Mexican Special 
                                                 
46 Grayson, Mexico, 157. 
47 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 
Theory,” The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (May 1977): 151, 
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Forces members.50 Initially, it was only through the close ties, cohesion, and trust that 
existed within the ranks of this military unit that Decena initially recruited former 
servicemen to form Los Zetas. Inevitably, the opportunity to make money also became a 
significant motivational factor that brought in the initial cadre of Zetas.  
Second, the existence of an established organization also provides the means to 
accumulate the necessary resources.51 For Los Zetas, this organization became the 
Special Forces unit for which its members had previously served. The former Special 
Forces members shared a sense of identity, history, cohesion, discipline, and a code of 
conduct. Ultimately, the former military unit provided the network ties, initial leadership 
and common ground necessary to form Los Zetas.  
In Mexico, a well-established network of nightclubs, casinos, and black markets 
offer institutional opportunities to attract ideal recruits and generate finances, which in 
turn, helps with growth and expansion. The ideal recruit is young and easily 
impressionable.52 Those who live on the periphery of society are easy subjects for 
recruitment, as very limited opportunities exist for legitimate employment, which leaves 
the criminal world as the only rational option for sustenance.53  
Third, from an economic standpoint, the concept of supply and demand is directly 
affected by the growth or compression of a social movement.54 For a criminal 
organization like Los Zetas, an increase in financial gain translates into an increased 
ability in fighting power, terrain expansion, and pre-eminence over a rival stronghold. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that an increase in financial leverage for Los Zetas will 
significantly increase its size and operational capacity.55  
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After the disruption of the symbiotic relationship with the CDG, the expansion of 
terrain and significant growth for Los Zetas was inevitable. The separation between the 
two entities left a power vacuum and opened new windows of opportunities. Los Zetas 
seized the opportunity to capture CDG’s territory and remove it from its control, which  
led Los Zetas to grow to an estimated 4,000 strong.56  
G. DEVELOPMENT OF AN INSURGENT/CRIMINAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
Aggrieved individuals and oppressive conditions exist in certain sectors of 
society; the same can be said about the presence of organized platforms and the flow of 
resources. The existence of aggrieved individuals, resources, and political opportunities 
alone do not lead to collective action’s emergence. The development of an insurgent 
consciousness is also necessary.57  
The development of an insurgent consciousness begins with the collective 
awareness of individuals that something can be done about social conditions. However, 
this development only occurs through the interpretation of significant events, worldviews, 
and ideology.58 Grievances must be framed in ways that define certain shared values, 
goals, and beliefs that connect individuals together. The shared interpretation of these 
experiences can result in the development of an insurgent consciousness.59  
Ultimately, the development of the consciousness in the context of Los Zetas 
befits the development of a criminal state of mind that supports its illicit activities. For 
example, the violence in Mexico can partially be attributed to the lack of socio-economic 
opportunities that exist in Mexican society, which then manifests itself as a vulnerability 
that criminal entities exploit to gain collective support of both the population and certain 
levels of state institutions. For Los Zetas, joining the CDG provided the means to 
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improve economic conditions and exploit other opportunities.60 Arguably, Los Zetas was 
also motivated by trust, cohesion, and a shared worldview; these attributes are inherent in 
small military organizations like GAFEs.  
Important factors in the development of the insurgent consciousness are the 
techniques and channels used in the interpretation of events to increase movement 
participation. According to Bert Klandermans, “anything that can be used to 
communicate meaning is applicable in campaigns to mobilize consensus.”61 Los Zetas 
attracts individuals through its interpretation of poor socio-economic conditions and 
exploits the government’s lack of response to improve them. By using the Internet, 
newspapers, banners and radio messaging, Los Zetas is able to coerce a large sector of 
the young unemployed male population into pursuing criminal solutions to perceived 
grievances.62 For example, in 2008, Los Zetas displayed a banner urging active military 
and former members to join them by promising concessions.63 The use of narco-banners 
and employment advertisements on the Internet are just a few of the methods that Los 
Zetas employ to lure potential members to fill its ranks. 
Another important element in the development of the insurgent consciousness is 
the extension of movement boundaries. The expansion of the social movement 
boundaries reaches individuals who do not immediately identify with the insurgent ideals, 
or in this case, the criminal organization’s goals. Los Zetas reaches out to communities to 
win their support. Local support allows for greater freedom of movement while 
conducting its operations.64 This process adjusts the interpretation of group values to 
match those of isolated individuals to entice them.65 For example, in Nuevo Leon, Los 
Zetas mobilizes the population against the military by exploiting the existing human 
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rights violations against them. Its methods to gain support include the distribution of 
gifts, toys and school supplies among the poor.66 In exchange, sectors of the population 
erect anti-military banners and conduct demonstrations against military presence in its 
area of operations. Los Zetas is able to mobilize over 30,000 people at a time, which 
facilitates the blocking of roads to obstruct the reaction of military and federal police.67 
Other channels of communications used by Los Zetas in developing an insurgent 
conscious are music and religion. For example, Los Zetas has its own song entitled 
“Escolta Suicida” (i.e., “Suicidal Bodyguard”), which accentuates its military discipline, 
and unit cohesion, as well as glorifying its criminal image by alluding to its kamikaze 
operational ideology.68 Los Zetas attempts to project an attractive image that appeals to 
the younger male population and ultimately lead to participation. A more recent attempt 
at framing is the saint of death worship used by Los Zetas to justify its violent actions,69 
which is gaining popularity among the poorer sectors of Mexico and provides a common 
ground between potential members and the organization.70  
In sum, Los Zetas attempts to influence the hearts and minds of individuals by 
several means. It continuously frames events to exploit the poor socio-economic 
conditions to attract support and participation. The organization’s resources, coupled with 
the lack of opportunities available to the aggrieved population, tend to favor Los Zetas’ 
modus operandi to develop an insurgent criminal consciousness.  
H. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Los Zetas manifests itself as the most dangerous criminal 
organization in Mexico. It successfully applies violent tactics similar to those of  
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insurgencies. It also seeks a certain degree of political influence and a strong support base 
at the municipal level. Although it does not seek to replace Mexico’s government, it 
seeks control of space and freedom of movement.  
Seen through the lens of social movement theory, and more specifically, the 
political process model, certain factors that help to explain the Los Zetas’ emergence and 
success have been identified. The presence of political opportunities, available resources 
and the development of an insurgent consciousness, have allowed criminal organizations 
like Los Zetas to emerge, grow, and succeed. Political opportunities have provided 
exploitable gaps in the environment that allowed it to emerge. The government’s 
inadequate response, consistent with targeting cartel leadership, created power vacuums, 
and competition, has contributed to the increase in violence. Access to large amount of 
resources sustains the continued growth of the organization. Los Zetas, through a 
diversity of illicit activities, has increased its access to material resources that support the 
group’s ability to corrupt and coerce both governmental institutions and the population. 
Finally, the development of an insurgent consciousness has helped to link individuals to 
the organization. The exploitation of the limited opportunities for the aggrieved 
population favored the development of an insurgent criminal consciousness sympathetic 
to Los Zetas. In the end, the methods to amass financial power have made Los Zetas a 
powerful criminal enterprise in Mexico today. This topic deserves a closer look, and 
consequently, is the subject of the next chapter.  
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IV. FINANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Los Zetas looks much like a global business organization, which responds rapidly 
and effectively to nearly any opportunity within its volatile environment. To maintain its 
fluid adaptability and versatility against counter drug efforts, the organization requires 
essential financial resources. It acquires the necessary resources by maintaining a 
sustained competition against rival cartels for the estimated $30 billion dollars generated 
by the drug trade in Mexico.71 Conveniently, Mexico’s geographical location serves as a 
corridor to the largest illicit drug market in the world. Sources estimate that over 90% of 
the cocaine that enters into the United States originates in South America and passes 
through its southern neighbor, which in turn, generates the necessary resources needed 
for cartels to remain operational.  
Los Zetas also exploits other lucrative opportunities that provide a significant 
amount of revenue to sustain its operations. During the three-year investigation, “Crime 
3” established that Los Zetas operates in New York and supplies South American cocaine 
to the port of Gioia Tauro, which is in southern Italy and the port of entry to Europe.72 
George W. Grayson, from the Foreign Policy Research Institute, wrote that Los Zetas has 
developed an increasingly diverse set of activities to maximize the profits of its business 
model. Furthermore, Grayson stated, “They [Los Zetas] have branched out into 
kidnappings, murder-for-hire, assassinations, extortion, money-laundering, and human 
smuggling.”73 In addition, Grayson said property ownership traced to Los Zetas in the 
United States ranges from pharmacies to nightclubs and resorts used as fronts “to launder 
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their drug profits.”74 Alternatively, because of the Merida initiative, the collaboration 
between Mexico and the United States to combat the illegal drug trade and seize 
significant amounts of illegal revenue has reached novel levels of success. Additionally, 
improvements to the “Kingpin Act” provide the additional leverage to counter the 
unlimited access of illicit proceeds to drug trafficking organizations. Arguably, the 
Mexican and U.S. governments have aggressively devised an improved counter-cartel 
strategy, but Los Zetas still manages to control enough financial resources to sustain and 
grow its organization.  
B. MONEY LAUNDERING 
Over the years, Los Zetas has become innovative and diversified the movement 
and laundering of money to finance its illicit activities. Not only is it using the latest 
technological means, such as electronic transfers through Money Services Businesses 
(MSB) and Traditional Depository Institutions (TDI) (banks), but it is also using 
rudimentary methods to include bulk cash smuggling, piracy, and theft. Additionally, the 
cartels have created legitimate front companies and traded real estate to funnel their illicit 
funds. Unfortunately, for Los Zetas, many of these methods are at times easily detectable 
and are well known to law enforcement entities. However, local business leaders and 
politicians are personally capitalizing on the cartel’s efforts and standing in the way of 
exposing and prosecuting these illegal activities, as in the case of numerous casinos 
operating in Monterrey. Nevertheless, Mexican state legislatures are attempting to 
combat money laundering in and outside their borders. 
C. BULK CASH SMUGGLING 
Due to the continual heavy demand for illegal drugs in the United States, Los 
Zetas has become more powerful and dangerous in its effort to monopolize the entire 
North American illegal drug trade. Therefore, it is not surprising that an increase in cash 
smuggling operations from U.S. drug markets returns to Mexico through the southwest 
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border. The method of choice to move the illegal U.S. drug profits is bulk cash 
smuggling. Bulk cash smuggling essentially is a low tech, yet innovative method, in 
which the Mexican drug cartels wrap bundles of $20 or $100 U.S. bank notes in plastic 
and stash them in unconventional ways, such as in tires and engine compartments of cars 
and trucks before transporting them across the border.  
The main reason for applying this course of action is enhanced U.S. anti-money 
laundering (AML) regulations, such as the USA PATRIOT Act and law enforcement 
actions that have made it more difficult to deposit drug proceeds into traditional U.S. 
financial institutions and then electronically wire them to recipients in Mexico. 
Consequently, Los Zetas has devised innovative methods to smuggle large amounts of 
cash through the southwest border effectively and efficiently. For example, vehicles have 
been modified and turned into large concealment devices to transport large sums of 
money. These methods are not easily detected by border agents and would require 
increased expenditure of resources if agents were expected to disassemble a suspected 
vehicle or trailer. 
The support infrastructure of drug cartels is as extensive as it is costly. Los Zetas 
has included in its payroll an array of employees ranging from politicians, policemen, 
accountants, smugglers, assassins, and lookouts to sustain their operations.75 Therefore, 
the process of repatriating money is just as important as the process that generates it. 
Arguably, denying Los Zetas access to money will diminish its operational capacity. 
For Los Zetas, southern Texas cities serve as primary hubs for centralizing money 
going south. Once money arrives at a collection point, it is redistributed into smaller 
bundles and passed to trusted agents or family members to move it across the border. 
Once the money is smuggled into Mexico, it is moved to safe houses primarily located in 
Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo. Accountants, who are charged with bookkeeping 
responsibilities, occupy the safe houses and keep the organization running.76 From the 
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safe houses, the money is typically washed through local businesses and casinos, which 
provide false documentation.77 Another option is to deposit money into less regulated 
Mexican financial institutions, such as banks and money exchange institutions, and then 
wire it to other financial institutions in Mexico. The money then returns to the United 
States and other countries that assist in facilitating the black market peso exchange. Next, 
the cash is then brought back to the United States by Mexican financial institutions as 
part of normal operating procedures, and the money is recirculated. Thus, Los Zetas can 
move the cash into international banks in Central America and South America or reinvest 
it into properties or other commodities to be spent on cartel operational expenses.78,79  
D. MONEY SERVICE BUSINESSES 
Although bulk cash smuggling is on the rise, it can be cumbersome and, more 
importantly, susceptible to total loss when detected and confiscated by border agents. 
Therefore, criminal organizations have diversified their money movement by turning to 
MSB, which provide a variety of money services, including exchanging cash for money 
orders, check cashing, money wiring, and selling of stored value cards. Los Zetas and its 
affiliates in the United States utilize the MSB as a mode to launder illicit funds to Mexico 
mainly due to convenience and relatively low governmental regulations.  
While MSB are not as regulated as TDI  (banks), wiring money internationally, 
regardless of means, tends to have more oversight. Therefore, to avoid suspicion, illicit 
proceeds are wired within the United States to collection points in the southwest border 
states. Subsequently, the money is moved across the border into Mexico through bulk 
cash smuggling operations. This procedure saves time and resources and reduces the 
interdiction threat by avoiding the extra step of physically moving large amounts of cash 
across the country. Notably, Mexico is the primary destination for suspicious and illegal 
funds sent through MSB in the United States.80 
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E. TRADITIONAL DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (BANKS) 
The USA PATRIOT Act tightened AML programs, which presumably made it 
more difficult to funnel terrorist (criminal) financing activities through TDI (banks). Due 
to this initiative, criminal organizations have evolved in their repertoire of money 
laundering by turning to the already mentioned bulk cash smuggling and MSB. However, 
the criminal organizations have not completely ruled out utilizing TDI and have learned 
to adjust their illicit procedures. One popular tactic is to deposit illicit money in U.S. 
bank accounts and then almost simultaneously withdraw it from ATMs located in other 
locations. This tactic is used before the banking system has a chance to detect suspicious 
activity and block further transactions.81  
F. LEGITIMATE/FRONT COMPANIES  
Criminal organizations operate legitimate companies and/or front companies 
throughout the United States, such as used car lots, restaurants, liquor stores, and 
gambling businesses to move and launder U.S. drug proceeds. Los Zetas has increasingly 
purchased and operated these type businesses along the southwest United States border 
states.82 This activity is not much different from what Mafia organizations have been 
doing in the United States for the last century. The front companies give the drug 
traffickers a central location where proceeds are taken and provide a legitimate cover for 
status and action for continual illegal activity.  
G. THEFT 
All criminal organizations have resorted to thievery to supplement their financial 
cash flow. The Mexican drug cartels are no exception and have found ways to launder the 
proceeds from stolen goods in clever ways. The most prevalent items stolen are oil and 
gas products, luxury automobiles, natural minerals, such as gold and copper, and any 
other high valued item that can be sold with relative low traceability. The most notorious 
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and genius theft operation conducted regularly by Los Zetas involves siphoning massive 
amounts of oil from the Mexican pipeline and then selling it to U.S. based refineries at a 
discount. This operation causes a two-fold problem for the Mexican government; it loses 
proceeds from the sale of oil (over $1 billion) and Los Zetas’ financial strength increases. 
More alarming is the fact that Los Zetas has penetrated the maximum-security fences 
used to secure the pipelines.83  
H. PIRACY 
Los Zetas also distributes pirated media products in northern and southeastern 
Mexico. In one instance, a member of Los Zetas, known as the “Czar of Piracy,” ran a 
business selling pirated CDs and DVDs that generated approximately $1.8 million dollars 
monthly.84 Piracy activities undermine U.S. sales of genuine products and deny U.S. 
copyright holders their profits. Mexican companies lost some $3.07 billion in 2009 
because of piracy and merchandise theft, according to a report from Grupo Multisistemas 
de Seguridad Industrial, an electronic security services firm.85 In addition to Tamaulipas, 
Coahuila, and Nuevo Leon, Los Zetas has also taken over the piracy business in Chiapas, 
Tabasco, Veracruz and Puebla, where protection and financial gain is an incentive for 
street merchants. Los Zetas has also entered the illegal liquor business; in northern 
Monterrey, Mexican Marines found approximately 100 boxes of adulterated whiskey and 
tequila in several houses. Reprehensibly, the municipal alcohol director, Rogelio Angel 
Gonzalez, was arrested at city hall for assisting Los Zetas to distribute the alcohol at bars 
and nightclubs in Monterrey.86 
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I. REAL ESTATE 
The Mexican drug cartels are purchasing vast amounts of real estate in the United 
States and Mexico to house and secure money for laundering, weapons, and drugs. The 
Mexican military has seized ranches, homes and warehouses owned by Los Zetas in 
Coahuila.87 In addition, the military has seized properties in Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, 
and in the southern states. The process is much like the legitimate business situation in 
which money is completely legitimate once the real estate is purchased and sometimes 
subsequently sold at a profit. The transaction also appears legitimate since owning land, 
homes, or business property is usually a “clean” transaction as opposed to suspicious 
front companies traditionally known to be illegal financial havens.  
J. EXTORTION AND KIDNAPPING 
Due to the significant amount of military and law enforcement pressure exercised 
against Los Zetas, this criminal enterprise has ventured into other means of generating 
revenue. Analysts assert that the increased numbers of extortions and kidnappings is the 
unintended outcome of Calderon’s offensive strategy against cartels.88 As a result, Los 
Zetas has expanded its criminal activities into extortion and kidnapping practices by 
exploiting multiple opportunities. The most common extortion methods include 
telephonic threats, mafia style charges for protection, business scams in the United States 
and Mexico, human trafficking, and the taxing of immigrants.  
Extortion practices by Los Zetas have proven to be a lucrative tactic and provide a 
continuous flow of finances. “Extortion fees over the six months totaled more than a half 
million dollars, ranging from $200 to $85,000 in more than 100 cases.”89 Ransoms are 
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tailored to the victims. If targeted individuals hesitate to pay even small amounts, the 
response may be merciless. Typically, unpaid ransoms result in the return of severed 
body parts to the victim’s family as a sign of worse to come.90 
As with most Los Zetas’ criminal operations, kidnappings and extortions are 
methodically planned and precisely executed. The kidnapping operation involves an 
elaborate plan that begins with surveillance on the target’s family and dwelling to 
document the daily routine. Typically, during the initial contact of these extortion 
operations, a Zeta member will contact a potential target over the telephone and attempt 
to extort money from that individual.91 The information collected provides leverage for 
intimidation to establish a sense of fear and credible threat against the targeted individual. 
Most of the time, extortion demands require money be transmitted through either a 
deposit, a transmittal through a money service business, or a similar form of electronic or 
credit type transaction to mitigate the possibility of law enforcement intervention.92  
According to Luis Wertman Zlav, who is the President of the Citizens Council for 
Public Safety and Law Enforcement in Mexico City, criminal extortion phone calls 
increased over 210% from 2009 to 2010.93 He claims that by December 2010, 
approximately 6,311 telephone calls made to threatened citizens were attributed to Los 
Zetas. Additionally, over 352,000 complaints of extortion via telephone were made in 
2010, of which 10,698 were successful and 341,017 were thwarted. In 2010, officials 
reported that 3,190 of the extortion attempts registered demanded that victims deposit 
money electronically.  
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Another type of extortion employed by Los Zetas is a mafia-style payment for 
protection. Wealthy families and businessmen are often targeted in this fashion. Most 
targeted families willingly pay the money up front to avoid future extortions. 
Unfortunately, wealthy families are not the only targets for protection and extortion 
schemes. Los Zetas also targets teachers and other individuals who are members of 
unionized organizations. Experts estimate that these criminal organizations are gaining 
inside access to victims’ personal information, such as bonuses, payment schedules, and 
even personal identifiable information to enhance extortion efforts. Typically, 
intimidation signs are posted on school grounds, and threatening letters are sent to parents 
and teachers that demand they pay their salaries and forfeit their Christmas bonuses to the 
extortion cells. Consistent with Los Zetas tactics, when demands are not met, the school 
grounds are then destroyed and buildings torched.94 Surprisingly, this type of extortion is 
even finding its way across the border and targeting U.S. businessmen, most whom are of 
Mexican descent, and vulnerable to threats against family members who still reside in 
Mexico.95  
Los Zetas is also earning a steady stream of cash from the mass kidnapping of 
migrants.96 These undocumented immigrants are risking their lives to find a job in 
Mexico or on U.S. soil. Coincidently, illegal immigrants have two borders to traverse. 
The journey typically requires them to move across the Central American-Mexican 
border and Mexican-U.S. border. Immigrants moving north mostly use freight trains to 
transit through Mexico and pass through Los Zetas controlled territory.97 Los Zetas 
selectively pull immigrants off the trains with automatic weapons, and lock them in small 
rooms, beat them, and extract the phone numbers of relatives (in the United States) to 
start ransom calls. Unfortunately, those who survive are forced to work as soldiers or 
mules to transport drugs across the U.S. border. On August 24, 2010, 72 immigrants, 
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most of whom were primarily Central Americans citizens, were executed on an isolated 
ranch in the northern state of Tamaulipas. In April 2011, nearly 183 bodies were 
unearthed in mass graves near the aforementioned state. The National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) found that in 9% of cases, corrupt police or immigration officials 
were involved in the kidnappings of immigrants.98 On May 12, 2011, Mexico City 
authorities fired seven regional directors of the country’s immigration agency following 
allegations that its officers in northern Mexico had delivered Central American migrants 
to kidnapping gangs presumed to be Los Zetas.99  
K. CASINOS 
Another area exploited by Los Zetas is the casino industry. The growing 
popularity of casinos provides fertile grounds for extortion. An incident revealing the 
utility of casinos for Los Zetas occurred in August 2011 when it set fire to a casino in the 
city of Monterrey over unpaid extortion, which killed 52 people.100 Casinos not only 
serve for extortion practices, but also offer a means to launder large sums of illicit money 
as well.101  
Recently, Mexico has experienced an upsurge in both legal and illegal casinos. 
From 2000 to 2011, the number of casinos increased from 123 to approximately 790, 
several hundred of these establishments operates illegally.102 For example, in Nuevo 
Leon, 31 out of the 57 existing casinos do so. The reason for this upsurge in illegal 
casinos is attributed to the connection of corrupt politicians and federal judges who 
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facilitate approval of establishments that operate outside the standing gaming laws.103 
Even legal casinos are a significant problem in combating organized crime since existing 
laws and regulations are unable to track the quantity and destination of the money that 
flows through these institutions. In the end, restricting access to casinos whether legal or 
illegal will deny Los Zetas a valuable money-laundering asset and potentially reduce its 
operational capability.  
L. COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING 
With all the negative news regarding increased money laundering activities, the 
Mexican government is attempting to combat it. Recently, on April 28, 2011, the 
Mexican Congress unanimously approved the Money Laundering Law to fight the 
Mexican drug cartels. The law’s provisions include serious efforts to limit large cash 
transactions, which makes it illegal to buy real estate with cash, and restrict the purchase 
of vehicles, boats, airplanes and luxury goods to 200,000 pesos ($17.3K) in cash. 
Violators can be sentenced from five to 15 years in prison and fined up to 4 million pesos 
($308K). As a result, it directs the attorney general’s office to create a special unit to 
monitor money-laundering activities and deliver an annual report to the Mexican 
Congress.104 
M. KINGPIN ACT 
Historically, economic sanctions have been the primary weapon to target the 
financial networks of drug trafficking organizations. Starting first in Colombia and then 
following the evolution of the narcotics industry to Mexico and beyond, the Treasury 
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targeted individuals and entities associated with some of the largest and most dangerous 
drug cartels operating in South America and Mexico, including, among others, Los 
Zetas.105 
The Kingpin Act is based on an earlier strategy used against Colombian drug 
cartels in the mid-1990s. The act was modified and enacted in 1999 to target the financial 
assets of drug trafficking organizations, including several Mexican drug cartels. 
Ultimately, the intent of the United States is to disrupt the flow of illicit revenue from 
reaching the hands of drug cartels that, in turn, use these resources to strengthen and 
expand their criminal operations. The United States has achieved some success in gaining 
the cooperation of foreign governments in the effort of freezing financial assets of drug 
cartels. However, organizations like Los Zetas employ innovative means to bypass the 
risk of interdiction posed by law enforcement entities. Although this initiative is a step in 
the right direction toward denying international drug lords financial resources, a more 
concerted effort is required to increase the intended effect that the Kingpin Act was 
designed to accomplish. To supplement this act, an executive order was signed that 
placed economic sanctions on four crime groups, to include Los Zetas. The order gives 
the U.S. Treasury Department the authority to seize money flowing through the United 
States traceable to members of foreign organized crime groups. It also prohibits U.S. 
citizens from involvement in property or financial transactions with the groups.106 
N. CONCLUSION 
Since the advent of President Calderon’s administration, both Mexico and the 
United States have made a concerted effort to counter illicit drug operations on both sides 
of the border. Although the current effort to counter illegal proceeds of Los Zetas has 
delivered significant setbacks to this criminal organization, it still has access to a 
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significant amount of financial resources. Los Zetas has adapted to the aggressive 
counter-drug strategy by seeking other means to generate revenue while maintaining a 
strong foothold within the illegal drug business in Mexico. Moreover, its resources enable 
Los Zetas to support the necessary operational requirements to achieve its goals. 
Although the counter-money smuggling efforts put forth by both Mexico and the United 
States are a step in the right direction, they require further improvement if the intent is to 
deny Los Zetas one of its most precious resources, money. Nevertheless, to disrupt a 
dynamic criminal organization like Los Zetas, much more than an understanding of its 
finances is needed. It is also crucial to examine its operational space. This topic is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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V. GEOSPATIAL INFRASTRUCTURE: OPERATIONAL SPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters highlighted how relevant the control of territory is to Los 
Zetas. The nature and geographic distribution of resources play crucial roles in shaping 
these networks, and therefore, their conflicts.107 To understand this organization further, 
it is now important to illuminate its operational terrain and key locations. To construct a 
graphic representation of Los Zetas’ operational environment, the research draws from 
spatial and temporal data. A wide range of sources can provide the necessary data to 
construct a map. Nevertheless, data research and map production requires time to project 
accurate information. Unfortunately, the rise of violence against media outlets has created 
an information gap on reporting criminal activity.108 One of the challenges in this study 
is the verification of sources and the information obtained to construct the map data. For 
the purpose of this research, the geographical analysis on Los Zetas concentrated solely 
on its operations in Mexico. 
Geospatial information can provide an important platform to display significant 
geographical activities in an operational environment.109 The fusion of geospatial 
information with temporal criminal activity enhances the overall operational picture of 
Los Zetas to construct a practical disruption strategy. The data used herein was extracted 
from a multitude of journals, newspaper articles, and blogs from the Internet. The 
information included security operations against and criminal acts by Los Zetas. 
Whenever possible, the information was compared and corroborated with other analytical 
sources.  
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The methodology consisted of coding relevant information into the Palantir 
government software, which facilitated the mapping of locations and events through the 
application of ArcGIS. ArcGIS is a system for creating and using base maps courtesy of 
ESRI, compiling geographic data, analyzing mapped information, transferring other maps 
and geographic information from a range of applications, and managing geographic 
information in a database.110 Unfortunately, not all reports contained precise locations of 
criminal activities; whenever this occurred, the coordinates to the nearest town were 
mapped.  
B. PATTERN ANALYSIS 
According to the authors’ analysis, several important features are revealed from 
the study of Los Zetas’ thematic map in Figure 3. Los Zetas’ area of operations 
encompasses most of Mexico’s eastern coastal line. The presence of Los Zetas is felt in 
the following states of Mexico: Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Veracruz, Tabasco, 
Campeche, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, Chiapas, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, 
Querétaro, Zacatecas, Durango, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, Mexico 
City, and Michoacán. The primary stronghold for Los Zetas consists of Nuevo Laredo, 
followed by Veracruz City. Nuevo Laredo is deemed as the most prized plaza in Mexico 
as it provides easy access into the United States border.111 Figure 3 shows major 
roadways and railways; to note, wherever there are railways, major roadways parallel. 
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Figure 3.   Roadmap of Mexico  
Another important location for Los Zetas is Veracruz City (Figure 4). This 
location has one of the largest maritime ports in Mexico and facilitates the entry of 
narcotics into the country.112 Nevertheless, some exceptions exist along the eastern 
coastal line where Zetas’ presence is limited or nonexistent. These areas are dominated 
by the CDG that has managed to maintain control of areas in Reynosa and Tampico 
(Figure 5).  
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Figure 4.   Veracruz City 
 
Figure 5.   CDG Contested Areas 
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Los Zetas contested areas with rival cartels consist of the states of Zacatecas, 
Tamaulipas, and Nuevo Leon. Zacatecas is centrally located in Mexico and contains a 
hub of road networks that facilitate expedient movement north to south. Most of the 
violence at this location is attributed to the ongoing turf battles between the Sinaloa cartel 
and Los Zetas. Another area of contention is in sectors of Tamaulipas (Frontera Chica 
and San Fernando), Nuevo Leon (Monterrey), and Coahuila (Saltillo) where Los Zetas 
fight for turf control against the CDG. The state of Tamaulipas is extremely valuable to 
the CDG as it has access to the sea and is in close proximity to the U.S. border. 
Surprisingly, with the aid of the Sinaloa cartel, CDG has defended this area well from 
Los Zeta control.113  
Conducting country-level analysis proves to be simpler than analyzing specific 
areas. Access to country level spatial data is easily available through an array of media 
channels. Nevertheless, to grasp the operational patterns of Los Zetas fully, it is of value 
to study specific areas of operations and focus on key pieces of terrain. Due to the limited 
scope of this study, the authors have focused their analysis on Falcon Lake, Frontera 
Chica, San Fernando, Nuevo Laredo, Monterrey, and Saltillo.  
C. FALCON LAKE 
Falcon Lake’s (Figure 6) geographical proximity between the U.S. border and 
Nuevo Laredo makes it a valuable piece of terrain for Los Zetas. Historically, Los Zetas 
used Falcon Lake to traffic illegal drugs into the United States. Incidentally, it has also 
been a location of increased criminal activities.114 This segment of the chapter analyzes 
Los Zetas’ activities in Falcon Lake from April 2010 to August 2011 and is intended to 
identify operational patterns to reveal its vulnerabilities. By using geospatial and 
temporal analysis, the authors seek to illuminate specific operational points on the 
ground, and trends over time based on the reported incidents. Ultimately, these findings 
will contribute to the overall disruption strategy against Los Zetas.  
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Falcon Lake is unique in that it shares a border with both the United States and 
Mexico. It also provides access to the only portion of the Mexican-U.S. border not 
complete desert or mountainous range.115 Additionally, it is conveniently located in a 
primary operational hub consisting of a strip of border towns called Frontera Chica 
(Figure 8). Los Zetas maintains complete control of this area and is dependent on the lake 
as a primary smuggling corridor for several illicit activities.116  
 
 
Figure 6.   Falcon Lake Boundary 
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D. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
Falcon Lake is located at 26° 52' 21” North, 99° 15' 18” West and has an 
estimated size of about 84,000 acres. Its dimensions are approximately 40 miles in length 
by four miles in width. Its widest measurements are at the southern portion of the lake 
near the dam.117 The narrowest dimension is located near its northern border near Arroyo 
Salado. The international boundary line is comprised of a series of numbered markers 
running along its north-south axis along the middle of the lake.118 Small vessels, go-fast 
boats, bass boats, and other types of maritime platforms navigate Falcon Lake. Two main 
boat ramps are located at Arroyo Veleno in the northeast and Falcon State park vicinity 
of the dam of Falcon Lake. These two boat ramps accommodate all types of boats and are 
open year round.119 Roadways surrounding the lake are highway 83 on the U.S. side and 
highway 2 in Mexico. Several secondary roads dissect the shoreline and provide an 
expedient link to the main highways near the lake.120 During periods of increased 
precipitation in the area, the water levels rise and several other ramps in the nearby 
camping sites are used as well. Surprisingly, boat permits are no longer required to transit 
the lake. The rule of thumb for lake navigation is that boats can cross international 
boundaries for fishing purposes as long as no contact is made with other boaters or 
land.121 On one hand, Falcon Lake maintains the recreational appeal to attract tourism, 
and on the other, criminal groups, such as Los Zetas, exploit its easy access into the 
United States to support its illicit activities.  
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1. Significant Activities (2010–2011) 
In the last two years, significant criminal activity (Figure 7) conducted at Falcon 
Lake reinforces its importance. During the months of April and May of 2010, multiple 
incidents of extortion were reported to the U.S. authorities. The incidents consisted of 
groups of 4–5 men dressed in military uniform, armed with assault rifles and equipped 
with communications gear that extorted and robbed U.S. boaters near the Old Guerrero 
church in Mexico.122 In June 2010, U.S. law enforcement and federal agents received 
information that Los Zetas intended to blow the dam at Falcon Lake. Although the 
reliability of this information was questionable, law enforcement agents heightened the 
level of security near the dam.123 The authors estimate that for Los Zetas to attack the 
dam, it would require a substantial amount of resources, and it is unlikely that an 
operation of this magnitude will occur. Nevertheless, the authors assume that generating 
rumors and bits of information alluding to attacks on Falcon Lake’s dam is advantageous 
to Los Zetas as it provokes a shifting of security resources within the lake; thereby, 
making other areas more vulnerable and facilitating smuggling operations. 
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Figure 7.   Significant Activities (2010–2011)  
Later that same year, in September 2010, an American citizen was shot and killed 
on the outskirts of the lake; his remains were never recovered. The killing of David 
Hartley occurred near the Old Church in Guerrero Viejo, Mexico.124 Not much 
information is known about this incident except that two U.S. citizens crossed into 
Mexican waters and were spotted by a scouting element of Los Zetas who potentially 
were protecting a precious cargo in the area. Unfortunately, Los Zetas’ immediate 
response was effective small arms fire, which resulted in the death of one American 
citizen. 
In May 2011, three separate incidents occurred near Salado Island. Two men 
armed with AK-47s extorted money from three U.S. citizens. It was reported that these 
individuals were traveling in go-fast boats and well equipped with radios and cell phones. 
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This incident occurred near marker seven along the boundary line on the U.S. side.125 
Two days later, Mexican marines successfully raided a Los Zetas’ camp located on an 
island inside the lake (Salado Island); the confrontation resulted in 12 Zeta members 
killed.126 Salado Island appeared to be a rendezvous point for Los Zetas operatives to 
store drugs before crossing into the United States. Additionally, the Mexican Marines 
captured 19 assault rifles (AK 47s and AR-15s), bulletproof vests, ammunition, 1 x .50 
cal. Barrett and what appeared to be a shoulder fire surface to air missile (SAM).127 In 
the same month, U.S. law enforcement agents engaged two rafts loaded with 548 pounds 
of marijuana. They chased the drug traffickers’ boats and forced the smugglers to 
abandon the shipment on the Mexican side of the border. The exact location of this event 
was not reported.128 On another incident, two armed men with assault rifles boarded and 
extorted money from U.S. vessels. The location of this incident was reported in the 
vicinity north of Salado Island near the ruins.129  
During the month of August 2011, a U.S. citizen on Mexican waters received fire 
from across the border.130 Although no one was injured, it highlights the potential 
dangers when on the lake. Los Zetas capitalizes on the use of this terrain and existing 
structures to facilitate the conduct of the transshipment of illegal drugs. They routinely 
use coves along the lake to screen its operations. A common defensive practice by Los 
Zetas is to place scouts on top of three-story buildings to provide early warning on  
 
 
                                                 
125 Denise Blaz and Lorraine Rodriguez, “Lanzan advertencia sobre Lago Falcón Comerciantes de 
Zapata dicen eventos siguen en puerta,” Zapata Times, n.d., 
http://www.thezapatatimes.com/zfrontera1.php. 




128 “Border Security and Law Enforcement Reports,” ProtectYourTexasBorder.com, 
http://www.protectyourtexasborder.com/News/WeeklyLawEnforcementUpdate/Archive/May132011.aspx. 
129 “Falcon Lake Incident Briefing on October 7, 2010,” Office of U.S. Congressman Henry Cuellar, 
Texas 28th District, http://images.bimedia.net/documents/20101007-Falcon-Lake-Briefing-Info.pdf, 13. 
130 Kocherga, “U.S. Man Fishing in Mexico Says He Escaped Gunfire on Falcon Lake.” 
  57 
imminent law enforcement activity. Additionally, reports indicate the use of lakeside 
cabins to store illicit merchandise for a short period of time before transshipment by road 
vehicles.131  
As Figure 7 shows, the spatial distribution of violence is concentrated 
predominantly near Salado Island. Three significant criminal activities occurred at this 
location. This piece of key terrain afforded Los Zetas with safe space to store a 
significant amount of drugs and served as a key transshipment point to avoid authorities. 
The second most active location is concentrated near the Old Guerrero church, and it is in 
close proximity to marker fourteen. This marker is the shortest distance within the lake to 
reach the U.S. border, and it is conveniently located near U.S. highway 83, which 
provides smugglers access to a high avenue of approach.  
2. Pattern Analysis 
The typical pattern of Los Zetas operations on the lake consisted of using go-fast 
boats to outrun authorities while carrying semi-large shipments of drugs. Typically, 
groups of 4–5 men armed with AK-47s and AR 15s manned these vessels. Los Zetas 
remains well armed and ready to protect its operations. Weapons systems found in Salado 
Island included a shoulder fire surface to air missile, a .50 caliber Sniper rifle, and several 
military grade machine guns. The tactics of extorting U.S. fishermen may be the response 
of the outer rings of Los Zeta security elements operating on the lake. The shooting 
incidents may be the responses of the closer rings of security protecting large stockpiles 
of drugs. Typically, Los Zetas has not intentionally targeted U.S. citizens, but several 
instances have occurred in which U.S. citizens were killed. Interestingly, even after the 
murder of David Hartley, Los Zetas has not reduced its operations in Falcon Lake. The 
lake remains a piece of key terrain that provides great access into the United States for 
smuggling drugs and generating revenue.  
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E. FRONTERA CHICA 
Frontera Chica (Figure 8) is an extensive strip of border in Tamaulipas; it extends 
from Nuevo Laredo to Reynosa. Frontera Chica includes the towns of Guerrero, Mier, 
Aleman, Camargo, and Diaz Ordaz; it is a highly contested drug corridor by members of 
Los Zetas and CDG. “There have been numerous confirmed reports of deadly gun battles 
taking place in and around the cities of Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa in the neighboring 
state of Tamaulipas and in small towns of Nuevo Leon that are north and east of 
Monterrey,” reports one source.132 The violence in this area has been so fierce that 
residents have fled to more secure places; in 2010 alone, there was an exodus of 
approximately 95 percent of the population in Cuidad Mier.133 With military clashes 
against the drug cartels being reported in each border town, the military has won its 
battles, although it has also suffered casualties, which prompted the GoM to construct 
three military bases in Tamaulipas; these new bases offer military presence and give the 
people the confidence to return to their homes.134 In Cuidad Mier, where one of the three 
military bases was built, a sense of normalcy has returned to the population of 7,500.135  
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Figure 8.   Frontera Chica 
F. SAN FERNANDO 
The municipality and city of San Fernando (Figure 9) is located in the Mexican 
state of Tamaulipas. San Fernando is infamous for two of the largest recorded massacres 
in the drug war. It has also been a place known for bus hijackings; three buses were 
hijacked in the Las Norias area, just outside San Fernando.136 Inside the 200-mile 
massacre sector around San Fernando, the main fact is obvious, there is widespread relief 
that a troop surge has occurred and that it has seemed to work, at least for now.137 
                                                 
136 “Details Emerge in San Fernando Bus Hijackings, Rescue,” The Monitor, July 18, 2011, 
http://www.themonitor.com/news/rescue-52885-authorities-bus.html  
137 Gary Moore, “Ending the Zetas Killing Spree: An Invisible Success Story,” InSight, September 22, 
2011, http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1604-ending-the-zetas-killing-spree-an-
invisible-success-story. 
  60 
 
Figure 9.   San Fernando 
G. NUEVO LAREDO 
Nuevo Laredo (Figure 10) is located along the northeastern border of Mexico.138 
Since 2003, the levels of violence in Nuevo Laredo escalated above historical records. 
Turf battles between Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel initiated a high wave of violence 
that undermined state security and rule of law. Halcones,139 or lookouts, passively 
control the major entryways to the city as well.140 In 2005, Alejandro Dominguez Coello 
was sworn in as police chief and was immediately assassinated within seven hours after 
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of his inauguration.141 Last year, Nuevo Laredo was the site of several violent battles 
between Los Zetas and the CDG. Ultimately, Nuevo Laredo continues to be a lucrative 




Figure 10.   Mexico-U.S. Drug Corridor 
Interestingly, the port of entry in Nuevo Laredo, with its close proximity to Texas, 
offers one of the most active commercial borders in the world. It is estimated that some 
5,000 trucks cross north into the United States every day. Coincidently, on the American 
side is Laredo, which is considered the largest landlocked port in the United States.143 As 
much as 40 percent of the legal business that enters the United States from Mexico enters 
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through Nuevo Laredo. Unfortunately, approximately 40 percent of the drugs entering the 
United States arrive in the same fashion.144 The opening of the Mexican economy has 
made Nuevo Laredo the most prized plaza or city square in Mexico.145  
1. Characteristics 
Nuevo Laredo’s strategic value is not only reflected in its close proximity to the 
United States. This city also benefits from its extensive connectivity to multiple lines of 
communications including international maritime ports of entry, borders, railways and 
major highways.146 A brief description of the major roadways that intersect Nuevo 
Laredo reinforces its strategic value for Los Zetas. Connecting Nuevo Laredo to the north 
with the United States is highway 35 (Figure 11). This avenue of approach provides easy 
access to the center of the United States and moves further to bridge Mexico with 
Canada. Running east to west on Nuevo Laredo’s northern boundary is highway 2. To the 
west are a series of secondary roads that provide limited connectivity to surrounding 
towns and connect to areas dominated by the Sinaloa cartel. To the south is highway 85, 
which provides the most important connection with the city of Monterrey, which 
provides access to Mexico’s southern border and western states.147 Ultimately, all these 
major highways converge in Nuevo Laredo and provide Los Zetas with a central location 
that supports a continuous flow of illegal drugs and a human smuggling corridor into the 
United States.  
 
 
                                                 
144 Vulliamy, Amexica: War Along the Borderline, 242. 
145 Ibid., 31. 
146 Joan Neuhaus Schaan, “Developing the U.S.-Mexico Border Region. For a Prosperous and Secure 
Relationship: Security in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands: The Crisis, the Forces at Work and the Need for 
Honest Assessment and Action,” Rice University, March 30, 2009, 
http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/LAI-pub-BorderSecNeuhausSchaan-033009.pdf. 
147 “Northern Mexico Highway Guide: #85 Nuevo Laredo to Monterrey Nuevo Laredo to Monterrey,” 
http://www.milebymile.com/main/Mexico/Northern_Mexico/State_85_1/Mexico_Northern_Mexico_road_
map_travel_guides.html. 
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Figure 11.   Halcon Activities in Nuevo Laredo 
2. Analysis 
To illuminate Los Zetas’ footprint further, in Figure 11, a blog reporting is used to 
construct an overlay of the organization’s support infrastructure in Nuevo Laredo. To the 
northern and southern boundaries of Nuevo Laredo, Los Zetas maintains a high presence 
with Halcones who remain vigilant. In the center of town, Los Zetas controls a series of 
businesses that serve as safe houses and storage facilities for the conduct of drug and 
human smuggling. To the southwest of the town, several outposts overlook the airport 
that serve as early warning against any significant military activity. In the eastern vicinity 
of Nuevo Laredo, one major crossing point exists along the Rio Grande that leads into the 
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United States and facilitates illegal route access for drugs and human smuggling.148 Most 
of the significant activity within the city is concentrated along Avenida La Reforma, 
which dissects the town from north to south and connects to highway 35.149 Overall, Los 
Zetas security mechanism is deployed efficiently within the city to provide a 360-degree 
security perimeter and allow enough reaction time to respond against a potential attack by 
security forces or a rival cartel.  
H. MONTERREY 
Monterrey (Figure 12) is the third largest city in Mexico and considered a Los 
Zetas stronghold.150 However, the CDG has been contesting areas southeast outside 
Monterrey in an attempt to gain a foothold on this strategic front. Behind el Cerro de La 
Silla, a mountain considered a national monument and recreational area, runs carretera 
(highway) Santiago-Cadereyta, a main avenue of approach, which connects highways 85, 
10, and 40, respectively, and provides access to main roads in all directions. Monterrey, a 
major center of commerce, is a strategic hub with a direct avenue of approach to the 
northern US-Mexico border. It is home to major transnational companies, such as 
CEMEX (cement company), FEMSA (Coca-Cola), Alfa (petrochemicals, food, 
telecommunications and auto parts), Axtel (telecommunications), Vitro (glass), Selther 
(leading mattress and rest systems firm in Latin America), Gruma (food), and Banorte 
(financial services). The FEMSA Corporation owns a large brewery, the Cervecería 
Cuauhtémoc Moctezuma that produces the brands Sol, Tecate, Indio, Dos Equis and 
Carta Blanca.151  
 
                                                 




149 “Informacion de Ubicaciones Casas de Seguridad, Halcones, Etc. Nuevo Laredo en Vivo. 
150 YouTube, “NarcoWar Special Report/Repore Especial de la Narcoguerra. (Mexico)1/3,” July 19, 
2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZ2X0jyu0bU. 
151 “State of Nuevo Leon,” mexicotIT, http://www.mexico-
it.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3:nuevo-leon&catid=15:nuevo-leon&Itemid=22. 
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Figure 12.   Monterrey 
Monterrey, Mexico’s business capital is ripe for extortion as cartel money is spent 
and laundered, and the wealthy choose to look the other way. As the military moves 
through Monterrey in the attempt to repel Los Zetas, the CDG has moved behind the 
military sweep to seize an opportunity to gain territory. Los Zetas has a tight grip on 
Monterrey; gangs are nonexistent, as they have all taken on what seems to be a franchise 
name, Los Zetas.152  
I. SALTILLO 
Saltillo (Figure 13) is the capital city of the northeastern state of Coahuila with 
approximately 648,000 inhabitants. It is located about 400 km south of the U.S. state of 
Texas and 90 km west of Monterrey, Nuevo León. To the south and east, it is surrounded 
by a series of low mountains called El Cerro del Pueblo. Saltillo sits in the Chihuahuan 
Desert that continues to the north and west. It boasts an international airport, which 
services both the United States and Mexico. Major roadways like highways 40, which 
                                                 
152 Alberto Torres and Francisco Gómez, ““Zetas” y los del Golfo se pelean Monterrey,” July 11, 
2011, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/778471.html. 
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runs west to Torreon 54, which runs generally northeast to Monterrey, and Mexico 57, 
which runs north to the U.S. border, converge on Saltillo; hence, it is a strategic piece of 
key terrain. It provides early warning capability for the larger hub (Monterrey), as well as 
operational reach into the central and western sectors of Mexico. Turf battles for this key 
drug corridor and control of the plazas have been heating up. Los Zetas has enjoyed 
unabated control of the plaza until recently, as rival organizations, such as the Sinaloa 
cartel, have attempted to supplant it.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Monterrey-Saltillo Connection 
In the attempt to gain the upper hand, cartels set blockades to seal entry and exit 
points to and from the city to control gun battles and overall movement. In one instance, 
Saltillo lay deserted after a chaotic morning during which fierce gun battles in the streets 
erupted between state police and army troops and marauding groups of gunmen, 
presumably Los Zetas, which left seven dead.153 Financiers, drug labs, safe houses and 
training camps have been found in this point on contention.  
                                                 
153 Borderland Beat Reporter Buggs, “Saltillo Under Fire,” Borderland Beat, March 5, 2011, 
http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/03/saltillo-under-fire.html. 
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J. CONCLUSION 
Describing the operational environment of Los Zetas is crucial to understanding 
the organization’s footprint. Key terrain is one of the most important resources for Los 
Zetas and its exploration through geospatial and temporal analysis can contribute 
immensely to the development of a disruption strategy. Yet, analyses that go only this far 
are disappointing; they only offer a limited snapshot of the criminal activities and pattern 
analysis of the organization. Although a significant amount of open source information 
describes Los Zetas’ operations countrywide, the same is not true for area specific 
incidents. For example, the analysis of Falcon Lake reinforces the above limitation. 
Incidents at this location are underreported from the U.S. side and almost nonexistent 
from the Mexican media. Currently, obstacles to report accurate criminal activity are 
even more evident in Nuevo Laredo. The recent attacks against journalists reinforce this 
argument.154  
Unfortunately, such analysis offers limited insight into the methods and tactics of 
this group, but it serves to reinforce the point made earlier that this criminal entity is 
adaptive and innovative. In the end, to understand fully how Los Zetas operates, several 
analytical tools must be used. Failure to dig deeper into these events will only limit the 
knowledge and understanding of those attempting to devise a practical disruption 
strategy.  
                                                 
154 “Watchdog: Attacks on Journalists in Mexico Threaten Press Freedom,” CNNWorld, September 8, 
2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-08/world/mexico.journalism_1_press-freedom-cpj-
crimes?_s=PM:WORLD. 
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VI. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The intent of this chapter is to analyze Los Zetas as a network using various social 
network analysis (SNA) metrics (i.e., centrality, and brokerage) that will help identify 
strategies for disrupting its operations. When attempting to undermine a criminal 
network, a strategy must be developed that identifies vulnerabilities (e.g., actors) within 
the network that can serve as targets; SNA can help in this regard. Often, the actors 
identified using SNA are located in crucial positions within the network (e.g., as central 
nodes, gatekeepers, or brokers) that connect the network and facilitate the flow of 
information and other resources across it. This chapter draws on a few of these metrics to 
identify members of Los Zetas who occupy these important positions. These metrics can 
then be visualized in a sociogram (i.e., social network diagram) where nodes are the 
actors and ties are the lines. 
Centrality and key player metrics are applicable to the study of criminal 
organizations, such as Los Zetas, whose organization is similar to the Apache Indians 
during the Spanish colonial period. Unlike the Aztecs and the Incas, the Apaches were 
not tied to a fixed location, nor did they have a commodity like gold they exclusively 
possessed.155 Like the Apaches, Los Zetas can organize for a particular operation and 
disperse at a moment’s notice without attachment to any man, weapon, or equipment left 
behind. For this reason, applying the right form of network analysis and understanding 
what makes each member distinct is critical. Centrality is useful in identifying high-value 
targets, but analysts should not limit their analysis to using just one centrality or key 
player measure nor suggest a single strategy but instead should draw on numerous 
metrics and craft a wide array of strategies, especially when tackling resilient and flexible 
criminal entities, such as Los Zetas.156 Indeed, because Los Zetas has a proven record of 
                                                 
155 Brafman and Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider, 18. 
156 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” Journal of Social 
Structure 12, no. 2 (2011), http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12/RobertsEverton.pdf. 
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resiliency, flexibility, and fluidity in its network, qualities that stem from the ways in 
which ties are constantly formed and strengthened or weakened and broken,157 an 
aggressive disruption strategy is in order, whose key tactical structure should be a 
“swarm” capable of a simultaneous, omni-directional attack.158 Identifying central 
players is a starting point for unraveling Los Zetas’ organizational structure.159 With 
tools, such as Palantir Government, UCINET, and ORA, it is possible to map its 
organizational structure and then use this knowledge to craft strategies to defeat it.160 
B. DATA 
For the analysis of the Los Zetas network, operational ties were used to extract 
information from open source mediums, such as newspapers, Internet sites, blog sites, 
books, journals, interrogation depositions, government reports, court documents, and 
Spanish and English press reports. The strength in open source information is its 
timeliness, sometimes just hours after the actual event occurred. Its weakness is its 
content and accuracy; the information gleaned must always be questioned and 
corroborated to prevent the risk of using misleading information. The authors feel 
confident that in the end, the data used are accurate and appropriate for analysis. 
Certainly, the network illustrated herein is a snapshot in time, but given that the data 
range from early 2000 through August 2011, they should provide a sufficient operational 
picture of the Los Zetas network.  
C. OPERATIONAL TIES 
Klerk has argued to gain an understanding of a criminal organization, analysts 
should attend to social phenomena, such as schools attended, roles played by individuals, 
                                                 
157 Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” in Networks and Netwars, ed. John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 67. 
158 This concept was introduced in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of 
Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000). This is how present and future conflicts should be fought; analysts 
will have to go much deeper than doctrine. 
159 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and 
Militancy, Issue 1382, (RAND, California: Santa Monica, 2001), 31. 
160 Note that SNA is just a tool amongst many tools and should never be used as a stand-alone means 
in analysis. 
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internal communication among actors, and so forth.161 This project uses operational 
relationships to analyze and suggest counter strategies to dismantle Los Zetas’ criminal 
organization. Initially, the operations relationship data of the 349 actors of the network 
was coded. Seventy isolates (i.e., actors with no ties) were then removed due to the 
assumption that the possibility of an isolate having a relationship with the main network 
was minimal, if not episodic, at best. Thus, it was possible to focus attention on the 
network’s most critical actors and not waste resources on tracking non-essential actors. It 
is assumed that Los Zetas relies on ties of trust, which represent potential lines of 
communication, coordination, and control. Furthermore, such ties are presumed to 
possibly be inactive but can be activated quickly if needed. 
D. SOFTWARE TOOLS 
The coding work of Los Zetas’ relationship network was prepared initially in 
Palantir Government,162 a software platform for analyzing, integrating, and visualizing 
various types of data, including structured, unstructured, relational, temporal, and 
geospatial data. It also can display, organize, store, and analyze friendly, threat, neutral 
and clandestine human terrain in a multi-dimensional environment. The data structured in 
Palantir were then exported to UCINET, a social network analysis program.163 While the 
network drawing program NetDraw is integrated with UCINET, ORA164 was used to 
visualize Los Zetas’ network. Figure 14 presents a sociogram of the Los Zetas 
operational network. 
                                                 
161 Peter Klerks, “The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organizations: Theoretical Nitpicking 
or a Relevant Doctrine for Investigators? Recent Developments in the Netherlands,” 1999, 56. 
162 Palantir Government, http://www.palantirtech.com/government.  
163 UCINET, http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/.  
164 Like Palantir Government and UCINET, ORA software is made in the United States and sponsored 
by the Department of Defense. CASOS, http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/. 
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Figure 14.   Sociogram of Los Zetas Network 
E. CENTRALITY 
Actor centrality is one of the oldest concepts in SNA, and is used substantially in 
the following analysis of Los Zetas. A number of different measures of centrality exists, 
each with its own assumptions of what constitutes a central actor. For the purposes of this 
thesis, four types of centrality are utilized: closeness, degree, betweenness, and 
eigenvector. Each type of centrality is discussed, in turn, as Los Zetas network is 
analyzed. 
  73 
1. Closeness Centrality 
Closeness centrality assumes that an actor is more central the closer (in terms of 
path distance) it is, on average, to all other actors in the network, and the higher an 
actor’s closeness score, it could indicate that information reaches an actor with more 
speed and accuracy than those with lower closeness scores.165 Table 1 and the sociogram 
in Figure 15 highlight the top ranked network members in terms of closeness centrality 
(red nodes in the sociogram).  
 
 
Table 1.   Closeness Centrality Top Ten 
                                                 
165 Sean F. Everton, Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network 
Analysis, DA4600 course text (Monterey, CA: Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2010); Sean Everton, Tracking, Destabilizing and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network 
Analysis, electronic workbook, version 1.05 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), 12. 
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Figure 15.   Closeness Centrality Top Ten 
Note that Heriberto Lazcano (the current leader of Los Zetas) is the most central, 
which suggests he is deeply involved with the coordination of Los Zetas’ activities. 
Second is Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, one of the group’s top leaders. Carlos Vera 
Calva and Galindo Mellado Cruz rank third and fourth, respectively, which is not 
surprising since they are original Zetas. They are still active and at large. Omar Mendez 
(captured) and Raul Trejo Benavides (deceased), both original Zetas, score the same in 
terms of closeness centrality and are of little concern since they are not currently active in 
the network. The remaining actors are of potential interest, however, and in particular, 
Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, who is second in command. 
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2. Degree Centrality 
Table 2 and Figure 16 indicate the highest ranked members in terms of degree 
centrality, which is simply the count of the number of an actor’s ties.166 As with the 
previous sociogram, the red nodes identify those members with the highest scores. Not 
surprisingly, they are all original Zetas and are all located in the same cluster.  
 
 
Table 2.   Degree Centrality Top Ten 
                                                 
166 Everton, Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis, 
DA4600 course text. 
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Figure 16.   Degree Centrality Top Ten 
Once again, Heriberto Lazcano is the most central actor, followed by Jesus 
Enrique Rejon-Aguilar who is third in command. Interestingly, Miguel Angel Trevino 
Morales, the second in command, is missing, which may be due to his lack of authority to 
give orders, or that he is cognizant of his environment and using a proxy to buffer his 
activities. In any case, his absence in these rankings should be taken seriously but not 
dismiss him as a central player because he does appear in other rankings. Two sets of 
actors (Omar Mendez and Raul Trejo Benavides, Raul Lucio Hernandez Lechuga and 
Rogelio Guerra Ramirez) have identical scores, which suggest that another measure is  
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needed as a discriminator for target prioritizing.167 Comparatively, the first seven 
members in closeness and degree centrality are ranked the same; furthermore, eight of the 
10 members are identified in both measures of centrality. 
3. Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality assumes that an actor has (potential) power over any two 
other actors when it lies on the shortest path between them in a given network. It 
identifies those actors in a position of brokerage to control the flow of resources through 
the network.168 As before, in Figure 17, all members of the network are colored dark 
green except those ranked high in terms of betweenness centrality (listed in Table 3), who 
are colored red. Unsurprisingly, Heriberto Lazcano is ranked first. He is followed by 
Esvin Leonel Batres Hernandez, who is currently detained and whose position in the 
network is somewhat unique. He does not rank high in terms of connections (i.e., he is 
not ranked in the top 10 in Tables 2 or 4), he is (or was) in a position in terms of 
brokerage in light of his betweenness centrality score. Alfonso Martinez Salvador 
Escobedo, Los Zetas regional leader in Tamaulipas, ranks third followed by Oscar 
Alejandro Duran, who was in charge of delivering payments to Zeta members and 
reporting on police and the military activities. Interestingly, the last two aforementioned 
members are not identified in the other three measures of centrality. Both control 
resources and are in a position of brokerage; Escobedo controls men, weapons, profits, 
and equipment and Duran traveled throughout the eastern coast of Mexico receiving and 
delivering payments, as well as reporting on GoM’s activities. 
 
                                                 
167 As a cautionary note, targeting individuals with same score may lead to inaccurate targeting; 
corroborating the analysis is essential. 
168 Everton, Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis, 
DA4600 course text. 
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Table 3.   Betweenness Centrality Top Ten 
 
Figure 17.   Betweenness Centrality Top Ten 
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4. Eigenvector Centrality 
Eigenvector centrality assumes that ties to highly central actors are more 
important than ties to peripheral actors, so it weights an actor’s summed ties (i.e., its 
degree centrality) by the centrality of the actors with whom ties exist.169 Table 4 and 
Figure 18 present the results of the eigenvector analysis where red nodes indicate the top 
10 ranked actors. These actors were all original Zetas so it is no surprise they are highly 
ranked. The cluster in which they are located also includes original Zetas, including the 
group’s founders, which suggests that this subgroup is united and loyal; moreover, most, 
if not all, have a military background, which makes this cluster extremely dangerous. In 
Table 4, the rankings again indicate that Heriberto is the most central followed by the 
number three in charge of Los Zetas, Jesus Enrique Rejon-Aguilar, who has been 
captured. Interestingly, Carlos Vera Calva, Galindo Mellado Cruz, Omar Mendez, Raul 
Trejo Benavides rank third, fourth, fifth, and sixth, respectively, which is not surprising 
since they are original Zetas. Calva is a military deserter, Cruz specialized in 
telecommunication and radio intercepts, Omar Mendez is a captured ex-military, and 
Raul Trejo Benavides, also an ex-military, is deceased. They all rank identical in all 
measures of centrality except betweenness. It can be assumed they have all cross-trained 
and have become proficient in each other’s skill they possess. Each Zeta is a leader at 
some level; each is a force-multiplier and lethal.  
 
                                                 
169 Everton, Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis, 
DA4600 course text. 
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Table 4.   Eigenvector Centrality Top Ten 
 
Figure 18.   Eigenvector centrality Top Ten 
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5. Summary 
Four centrality measures were used to analyze Los Zetas’ network as a backdrop 
for the development of a disruption strategy. A considerable overlap of those members 
ranked high in closeness, degree, and eigenvector centrality exists, all of whom are 
original Zetas. However, a substantial difference occurs in those who scored in terms of 
betweenness centrality and the other three metrics. Seven actors appear in the 
betweenness rankings that did not appear in the other rankings. Nevertheless, all are 
original Zetas. 
Unfortunately, centrality metrics do not always completely capture a network’s 
vulnerabilities. For instance, Heriberto Lazcano scores high in all of the centrality 
measures (see Table 7), but his removal, although critical, would not totally fragment the 
network. The clusters would still be intact, and Los Zetas would probably continue to 
operate. Indeed, Los Zetas has lost its top leader before and many of the original Zetas 
are dead or in prison, but it has continued to live on, an indication of its resiliency. 
Indeed, available research suggests that targeting the most central actors for removal or 
isolation is not always the optimal solution.170 
One of the weaknesses of centrality metrics is that it attempts to quantify the 
structural importance of actors in a network, but not necessarily, which individuals are 
important for the network as a whole. This weakness could prove problematic if seeking 
to neutralize members of Los Zetas to disrupt the network’s operational ability or to 
identify optimally positioned Zetas to diffuse (mis)information, attitudes, and behaviors 
quickly to undermine the network’s effectiveness. Fortunately, a set of key player metrics 
has been developed to address this limitation;171 it is this set of algorithms that is 
examined next. 
                                                 
170 Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 2011. 
171 Stephen P. Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network,” Computational, 
Mathematical and Organizational Theory 12, no. 1 (2006). 
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F. KEY PLAYER 
Stephen Borgatti has developed an algorithm that seeks to identify an optimal set 
of actors whose removal either disconnects or significantly fragments the network.172 
Two variations of the algorithm exist. One uses a standard fragmentation measure to 
gauge how much various sets of actors fragment the network if they are removed from 
the network. Simply put, a fragmentation score is calculated both prior to and after the 
removal of each set, and the set that increases the level of fragmentation the most is 
considered the optimal set. The second is similar to the first except that rather than using 
the standard fragmentation measure, it uses a distance-weighted measure that identifies 
the set of actors whose removal most lengthens the average path distance between all 
pairs of actors in the network. Recognizing that the removal of actors may not always be 
the best or desired strategy when working with dark networks, Borgatti has developed an 
additional algorithm that looks “for a set of network nodes that are optimally positioned 
to quickly diffuse information, attitudes, behaviors or goods and/or quickly receive the 
same.”173 Borgatti also developed two variations of this algorithm. The first simply 
counts the proportion of distinct actors reached by the set of key actors, while the second 
weights this calculation by the path distance between the set of key actors and all other 
actors in the network. For this analysis, the standard (rather than the distance-weighted) 
algorithms are used. The size of the set is a decision for analysts to make. As discussed in 
detail below, the authors ultimately asked each algorithm to identify sets of size 10 
although sets of various sizes were estimated. Finally, the key player algorithms do not 
rank members; they simply list the actors as they appear in the network. 
Key player sets of size five through 10 members were identified and compared 
both visually, (see Figures 19 through 30) and in terms of fragmentation metrics. In the 
end, it was decided to use a set of size 10 (Table 5) because it significantly fragments the 
network and enough resources in the GoM’s arsenal exists to execute a kill/capture 
operation of that size. In Figure 19, a group size of five is identified within the network, 
                                                 
172 Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network.” 
173 Ibid., 22. 
  83 
while Figure 20 depicts a sociogram with the five members removed. Note the minimal 
amount of fragmentation; removing this particular group of Zetas would cripple the 
organization but probably only temporarily. Interestingly, the largest cluster that remains 
consists of all original members of Los Zetas. A key player set of size six (Figures 21 and 
22) would remove the previous five plus Sergio Enrique Ruiz Tlapanco (an original 
Zeta), but the main cluster still maintains its integrity even with his removal. A key 
player set of size seven (Figures 23 and 24) identifies the previous individuals in addition 
to Omar Lormendez Pitalua, another original Zeta. It also appears to cause only minimal 
damage to the network. Interestingly, a set of size eight (Figures 25 and 26) includes 
Sigifredo Najera Talamantes, who is not an original Zeta, but whose removal fragments a 
cluster laying on the periphery. A set of size of nine (Figures 27 and 28) adds German 
Torres Jimenez, an original Zeta, and appears to weaken the largest cluster. Finally, a set 
of size 10 (Figures 29 and 30) targets Julian Zapata Espinoza and further disconnects 
clusters on the margins. As can be seen, a set of size 10 causes the network to fragment 
the most, which makes its size the best-case scenario. More isolates and smaller clusters 
remain. Except for the cluster containing original Zetas, the rest of the clusters would 
become leaderless or without a person of authority; most are followers waiting to be 
tasked out. They would either attempt to make contact with an original Zeta, implode and 
disperse into the population, or attempt to keep cluster integrity and continue its criminal 
activity. Whatever the case, it will make it possible to craft a kinetic strategy even though 
large clusters remain. 
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Table 5.   Key Player Outputs for Removal; See Figures 19–30 for Sociogram 
  
Figure 19.   Five Key Players Identified 
for Removal 



















Figure 21.   Six Key Players Identified 
for Removal 
Figure 22.   Six Key Players Removed 
 
  
Figure 23.   Seven Key players 
Identified for Removal 
















Figure 25.   Eight Key Players Identified 
for Removal 
Figure 26.   Eight Key Players Removed 
  
Figure 27.   Nine Key Players Identified 
for Removal 
Figure 28.   Nine Key Players Removed 
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Figure 29.   Ten Key Players Identified 
for Removal 
Figure 30.   Ten Key Players Removed 
As noted above, Borgatti also developed a diffusion algorithm that can be used in 
conjunction with a deception campaign that seeks to sow seeds of distrust throughout a 
network. Table 6 lists the optimal set of actors identified by this algorithm while the 
sociogram displayed in Figure 31 identifies these individuals by coloring the respective 
nodes red. Three members of Los Zetas, Heriberto Lazcano, Miguel Angel Trevino 
Morales, and Oscar Alejandro Duran, were identified by both key player algorithms, 
which suggest that either a capture/kill or deception operation that targets these 
individuals is viable. Targeting these men for deception operation while targeting the rest 
for kill/capture operations would be a consideration.  
As with the key player fragmentation algorithm, with the diffusion algorithm, sets 
of size five through size 10 are compared and it was determined that a set of size 10 
reached the greatest number of actors. As stated earlier, the network illustrated herein is a 
snapshot in time; Los Zetas are considered well over 4,000 members strong. Therefore, 
using a group of 10 for diffusion would ensure at a minimum that those members in this 
network would be embroiled in a deception campaign at some capacity. Interestingly, 
five of the 10, Alfonso Martinez Salvador Escobedo (regional leader), Esvin Leonel 
Batres Hernandez (captured), Heriberto Lazcano, Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, and 
Oscar Alejandro Duran (captured), are also identified in the betweenness centrality 
measure. The other five members identified are Jose Manuel Benitez Carballo (cell 
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leader, hitman), Anubis Anula Martinez (cell leader, ex-infantryman, hitman), Armando 
Rivera (cell leader, hitman, and bodyguard), Yaneth Deyanira Garcia Cruz (financier), 
and Rene Alberto Quiroz Tadeo (Halcon leader, hitman). Interestingly, the latter four 
members also serve as leaders, although in a lower capacity, and lie on the periphery and 
are the hubs that connect their cluster to that of the original Zetas. Yaneth Deyanira 
Garcia Cruz is the only female identified; her role is significant in that she has been 
handling large sums of money for the criminal organization before Los Zetas split from 
the CDG. Her knowledge of both organizations would immensely facilitate a strategy. 
 
Table 6.   Key Players for Diffusion 
 
Figure 31.   Key Player Diffusion 
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G. SUMMARY 
Table 7 summarizes the results of the centrality and key player metrics used in 
this chapter’s analysis. As noted earlier, a high degree of correlation exists concerning 
degree, closeness, and eigenvector centrality. However, they do differ substantially from 
the optimal set of key players identified in terms of fragmentation; indeed, more overlap 
occurs between the key player fragmentation metrics and the betweenness centrality 
scores. In terms of a deception operation, it can be seen that some overlap exists between 
the key player diffusion algorithm and the other rankings. All of this suggests that before 
any final decisions are made, additional data mining and information gathering on the 
Los Zetas network is probably in order. Finally, whether using centrality measures or key 
player algorithms, one thing is clear. The cluster of original Zetas remains intact, which is 
the nexus and center of gravity for Los Zetas, the essential operational ties, and although 
not depicted, ties with a military legacy these men have left behind. The next chapter 

















Numbers refer to rank in each measure, 1 is highest score. Only the top 17% (20 
actors) are ranked based on measure outputs. 
Table 7.   Centrality and Key Player Measures within Los Zetas’ Network.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this study was to identify key organizational components of 
Los Zetas, whose disruption will weaken or undermine its operational capability. 
Drawing from elements of SMT, the research focused on analyzing the resource 
components necessary for Los Zetas to emerge, grow and succeed in its operations. The 
authors researched in detail the financial aspects of Los Zetas and then used geospatial 
analysis to explore modes of operations in key areas of interest. Finally, SNA was 
employed to amplify the view of its organizational structure. The driving argument of this 
research remains that denying Los Zetas access to critical resources; key terrain and 
targeting its organizational structure will force Los Zetas to collapse or greatly diminish 
its operational capability.  
B. APPROACHES 
Two different approaches are available to choose from with a variety of strategies 
under each respectively. The kinetic route can be chosen using faceless, armed warriors 
moving surreptitiously into terrorist safe havens, closing in with well-placed shots to the 
enemies’ heads. Although direct action as just described can play a critical role in 
diminishing threats, it is not the only available tool; it may be particularly detrimental to 
achieving more pervasive effects. Certainly, killing a key member of a criminal network 
creates an immediate gap. Yet often, that gap is only temporary, and the network may 
even exhibit more fervor in response.174 Thus, when formulating an effective counter 
cartel strategy, it is best to consider a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic measures 
that complement each other and allow authorities the greatest amount of control. The 
indirect route strategies include Information Operations, Military Information Support 
Operations (MISO), as well as reconciliation and reintegration operations. 
                                                 
174 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” Journal of Social 
Structure 12 (2010): 4. 
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The key is not to simply disrupt the network. The very essence of a decentralized 
network is that disruption or elimination of the hubs or other ties does not and will not 
stop the movement.  
Leaders at strategic levels, as well as grass roots leaders, are consulted for 
inspiration and as virtual hubs, keep the idea and the impetus alive over any operation. 
Los Zetas may die, but the ZETA ideology will continue. In The Starfish and the Spider, 
authors Ori Brafman and Rob Beckstrom, note: 
A decentralized organization is a completely different creature. Nevins 
explained that the traits of a decentralized society—flexibility, shared 
power, ambiguity—made the Apaches immune to attacks [by the 
Spaniards] that would have destroyed a centralized society.175  
The authors’ approach is strictly military in nature, which is part of a greater holistic 
strategy that seeks to disconnect not only the actors, but to sow seeds of distrust within 
the network to begin its implosion.  
The number of relationships and knowledge type between relationships leads to 
an actor’s adaptability, which is commensurate to flexibility. Conversely, the less aware a 
member or members become, the greater the likelihood of a network developing distrust 
and imploding. A highly connected network will have many members with operational 
ties, and thus, fewer single cut points. A sparse network may have communication chains 
fragmented easily by the elimination of one or two key persons, which reduces its ability 
to give and receive information. Siblings quarrel routinely over trivial events; the effects 
of intentionally injecting seeds of distrust issues along fault lines of trust and then 
severing family communication links would be damaging to the relationship. Eventually, 
tensions will build; family unity will begin to unravel, which then forces members to turn 
their attention and activities towards issues of trust and dissension. 
                                                 
175 Ori Brafman and Robert Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of 
Leaderless Organizations (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 21. 
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C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analytical tools mentioned previously are all interdependent of each other. 
Developing an efficient disruption strategy will require engagement in all instruments of 
national power. These recommendations are based on the exploration of its financial 
practices and geospatial, temporal, and, SNA, of its organization. Table 8 provides a 







(Countering Illicit Finance Methods) 
Attack Finance Infrastructure 
Capture/Kill Stricter laws 
Raids/ Seizures Increase punishment 
Freeze Assets 
(Geospatial and Temporal Analysis) Key Terrain: 
Deny Access to Key Terrain 
Falcon Lake 
 
Increase presence (Coast Guard) Increase Surveillance 
Escalation of Force Restrict Movement 
Request permits 
Increase Cooperation 
(Geospatial and Temporal Analysis) Key Terrain: 
Regain/Control Access to Key Terrain 
Nuevo Laredo 
Capture/Kill Rehabilitation 
Clear & Secure: Unity of effort 
(Isolate Population) 
Support self-defense groups 
Work with Zetas’ opposition 
Control Terrain Hold, build 
 
(Social Network Analysis) 
Attack the Network 
Capture/Kill Rehabilitation 
Penetrate Organization Deception/ Surveillance 
Counter Perception Operations Media Campaign 
Simultaneous Targeting Increase Capacity/Cooperation 
Table 8.   Los Zetas: Disruption Strategy (Not All Inclusive) 
D. FINANCES 
The recommended strategy to disrupt the money flow of Los Zetas includes both 
kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. For the kinetic approach, it is essential to continue 
the aggressive targeting of financiers and accountants. Apprehension of financiers denies 
the organization of specialized skills not easily replaced, which in turn, degrades their 
ability to sustain operations. Monterrey serves as the money-laundering hub for Los Zetas 
using casinos.176 The main disruptive effort should focus on targeting individuals tied to 
the casino industry. Denying Los Zetas access to the casinos in Monterrey will force it to  
 
 
                                                 
176 Ramsey, “Behind the Battle for Monterrey.” 
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move further away from its main operational center in Nuevo Laredo. This action will 
cause it to overextend its resources to areas south and west from Monterrey and thereby, 
increase its vulnerability to rival cartels.  
The non-kinetic recommendations are nationally focused and consist primarily of 
enforcing the recent amendments to the strategy for combating financing of illegal drug 
cartels. Recently, Mexico established significant limits on U.S. dollar transactions 
allowed under law by Mexican citizens and tourists.177 A tighter enforcement and 
monitoring of these new laws is required to have an effective impact on combating 
money-laundering operations. Although these amendments are a step in the right 
direction, innovative criminal organizations can bypass these restrictions in several ways.  
E. GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS 
To understand this organization further, it is now more important to illuminate its 
operational terrain and key locations. To construct a graphic representation of Los Zetas’ 
operational environment, spatial and temporal data was analyzed. Access to country level 
spatial data was easily available through an array of media channels, but due to the 
limited scope of this study and time constraints, the disruption strategy focused on Falcon 
Lake and Nuevo Laredo, both part of a strip of terrain called Frontera Chica, which is in 
close proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border. 
F. FALCON LAKE 
Los Zetas continues to enjoy a significant level of freedom of movement across 
the U.S. border.178 Developing a disruption strategy that will diminish its operational 
freedom of action requires utilization of several disciplines. Employment of temporal and 
spatial analysis of criminal activities reveals critical information of its operational 
                                                 
177 “In Mexico, Transactions with Dollars Face Scrutiny,” Associated Press, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/world/americas/16mexico.html. 
178 Kelsey Sheehy, “Hill Republicans Try to Designate Mexican Drug Cartels As Terror Groups,” The 
Daily Caller. http://dailycaller.com/2011/05/12/hill-republicans-try-to-designate-mexican-drug-cartels-as-
terror-groups/#ixzz1ZfjuCMBW. 
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environment.179 Interestingly, the analysis on Falcon Lake revealed that Los Zetas 
frequently transits the area and faces minimal obstacles gaining access into the United 
States. Denial of this access point can severely limit Los Zetas’ resource generation 
means. It is important that both U.S. and Mexican authorities regain complete control of 
this area by establishing a permanent presence on the lake. One recommendation is to 
establish a presence with the augmentation of Coast Guard vessels. Permanent presence 
of Coast Guard vessels and security patrols will allow for greater coverage of the lake. It 
will also provide existing border patrol units at the lake with sufficient flexibility to cover 
other areas of the terrain.  
A criminal activity analysis of the lake revealed that Los Zetas remains most 
active in the northern area. Increased security presence in this location will deny it 
unrestrictive access into the United States and force it to shift operations to the wider 
portion of the lake or abandon it completely. Additionally, the use of technology enablers 
can reveal important points of vulnerability against Los Zetas. For example, employment 
of Intelligence Surveillance (ISR) platforms can provide a wider coverage of the lake to 
alert authorities of significant activities. The utilization of unattended ground sensors can 
complement coverage on areas where surveillance platforms have dead space. 
Employment of maritime radars at this location can increase situational awareness of 
ongoing criminal activities.  
Ultimately, to effectively deny Los Zetas access to Falcon Lake, a unity of effort 
between both sides of the border will have to be established. Both the U.S. and Mexican 
authorities need to increase cooperation and share information to suppress smuggling 
activity on the lake. In the end, U.S. and Mexico’s border security issues require close 
collaboration and the security challenges manifested at Falcon Lake are no exception.  
G. NUEVO LAREDO 
The analysis of Nuevo Laredo reveals that Los Zetas maintains overwhelming 
control of and freedom of movement in this city. Nuevo Laredo has several avenues of 
                                                 
179 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “FM 3-24. Counter Insurgency,” Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publication, no. 3–33.5 (2006): Appendix B, b–1–2. 
  96 
approach that facilitate escape routes and free access. Most of Los Zetas’ presence is 
concentrated along Avenida La Reforma to protect drug storage facilities and safe 
houses. Los Zetas’ support infrastructure in Nuevo Laredo is well distributed to provide 
early warning and defense against incoming offensives.  
A strategy to regain control of this location will require a substantial effort from 
the government of Mexico similar to the initiative put forth during Operation Secure 
Mexico in 2005.180 Although this operation produced significant results, the effects were 
temporary and Los Zetas still managed to remain in control of Nuevo Laredo. The intent 
of this approach is to exercise authority in this city and permanently isolate the 
population from the influence of Los Zetas. It would begin with sealing the town’s access 
points and preventing reinforcements from entering or allowing Los Zetas to escape 
Nuevo Laredo. After blocking the main avenues of approach, the main effort shifts and 
concentrates on clearing Avenida La Reforma. It is necessary to swarm these operational 
centers with overwhelming force to clear and secure key terrain. Once the city is secured, 
the effort should shift to holding in place. The holding phase requires security forces to 
show presence with persistent patrols and to begin to win the trust of the population by 
remaining in place. During this phase, the intent is to project the image that the 
government establishes and maintains social control and not Los Zetas. Holding the 
terrain demands an increase in manpower; therefore, a rehabilitation process is essential 
in this phase.  
The establishment of a National Guard concept that instills integrity, loyalty, and 
a renewed pledge to protect and serve the people can act as a platform to rehabilitate 
individuals, reintegrate them back into society, and increase security resources in the 
area. The intent of the National Guard concept is threefold. First, the recruitment of 
unemployed males into a formal structure provides the government a method of control 
over a significant sector of the population and limits Los Zetas’ recruitment. Second, this 
concept provides individuals with identity, status, and best of all, the means for 
subsistence. Third, this concept provides internal security to the local area and prevents 
                                                 
180 STRATFOR: Global Intelligence, “Mexico: Fox's Uphill Battle to Win the Drug War,” June 29, 
2005, http://www.stratfor.com/mexico_foxs_uphill_battle_win_drug_war.   
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Los Zetas from returning to Nuevo Laredo. In the end, this isolation strategy separates 
Los Zetas from arguably the most important resource for the organization, the 
population.181 Another piece as important to operationalize is an oversight committee 
similar to internal affairs independent of the National Guard to dissuade corruption. This 
approach is intended to have a long-lasting effect by providing employment and other 
socio-economic options for the population.  
H. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS/ KINETIC 
The authors’ recommended kinetic approach focuses on the elimination of key 
nodes and links between individuals, groups, and organizations.182 It is based on the 
results of identification of key actors in terms of closeness, betweenness, eigenvector, and 
degree centrality measures, as well as key player algorithms. Based on these measures, 
the authors contend that the individuals listed below must be captured, killed, or 
neutralized.  
Removing the 10 top key players does fracture the network by splitting it into 
smaller clusters/groups by breaking communications; therefore, key players should be 
considered in the decapitation or kill/capture strategy also. In addition to the smaller 
clusters, more isolates (nodes or members with zero links or ties) are seen. Two 
members, Heriberto Lazcano (Top Leader) and Miguel Angel Trevino Morales (Second 
in Command), appear in both the removal and diffusion tables; therefore, either option is 
viable. Their removal from the organization will significantly fragment the structure and 
severely inhibit Los Zetas’ operational capability. It is important to note that individuals 
imprisoned in Mexico maintain significant control and influence over operations in the 
organization.183 Therefore, to counter the detained individuals’ influential control over 
the criminal network, it is necessary to extradite and completely isolate them. In Table 9, 
the Key Player algorithm KPP-NEG reveals 10 members of Los Zetas for removal 
                                                 
181 Robert Culp, “Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations,” Small Wars Journal, January 2011, 
smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/656-culp.pdf. 
182 Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 4. 
183 Eidart, “Drug Gangs “Self-Rule” Mexican Prisons,” 
http://eideard.wordpress.com/2011/04/30/drug-gangs-self-rule-mexican-prisons. 
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consideration. Six of the 10 appear under betweenness (brokers) and two under 
eigenvector centrality, respectively. Due to the members’ resourcefulness and proximity 
to central leaders, their removal is recommended as well. 
 
 
Table 9.   Nineteen of the 349 Members Coded Represent 5.4% of the Network for 
Removal of the Entire Network, but a Higher Percentage of the Connected 
Network. 
I. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Two important factors should be considered when pursuing the kinetic approach 
against individuals in Los Zetas’ network with high closeness centrality. First, members 
with a high closeness centrality are too embedded in the core of the organization and 
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would not be responsive to rehabilitation or counter ideology tactics.184 Second, some 
criminal organizations have the ability to replace individuals at the top quickly and 
remain resilient against hostilities.185 Consider the members with high eigenvector 
centrality, as they are members of the organization with ties to highly central members 
who may be in a position to replace existing leaders. They may have intimate knowledge 
of the internal affairs within the organization solely due to their close proximity to current 
leadership. In Table 9, the top two ranked members are current leaders already. Thus, it 
may be prudent to consider those ranked third through tenth as emergent leaders (i.e., 
potential future leaders) because of their proximity to current leaders. Los Zeta member, 
Jesus Enrique Rejon-Aguilar, has already been captured and little is known about 
constraints on his daily activity or the activity of those at large. The common ground with 
members with high eigenvector centrality is that they are all original Los Zetas. 
Therefore, a targeting strategy against Los Zetas has to shift to simultaneous targeting 
versus the current sequential approach. Nevertheless, a disruption strategy solely focused 
on a kinetic approach will produce limited results.  
J. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS/NON-KINETIC 
A non-kinetic approach takes longer to implement, but once emplaced, it can 
contribute immensely to a disruption strategy. The non-kinetic options against Los Zetas’ 
network focuses on using a deception strategy against individuals rated with high 
betweenness centrality.186 Based on the authors’ analysis, it is possible to identify two 
individuals. The contention is that these individuals provide the optimal platform to inject 
bites of misinformation into the network and produce the greatest disruptive effects. 
Referencing Table 10, if dissention can be created between Heriberto Lazcano and 
Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, it might split the organization. The end state intended 
with this approach is to create an implosion or fragmentation of the organization.  
                                                 
184 Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 16. 
185 Ibid., 11.  
186 Ibid., 14. 
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Members who rate high in betweenness centrality are those who hold leverage 
between clusters and groups within the organization due to positions of brokerage. 
Hence, it is expected that the misinformation will provoke enough friction to force 
preemptive attacks against other members, which causes a fragmentation or weakening of 
the organizational structure. In addition, Table 10 reveals that five of the 10 members 
identified in both betweenness centrality and the Key Player KPP-POS algorithm are 
original Zetas and central to the organization. The other five members identified for 
diffusion under the KPP-POS algorithm are not original Los Zetas and remain on the 
periphery of the criminal organization. 
These individuals are listed below. 
 
 
Table 10.   Seventeen of the 349 Members Coded Represent 4.9% of the Network for 
Diffusion. 
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In summary, the use of social network analysis offers an additional optic to 
illuminate Los Zetas’ organizational structure. It provides the necessary magnification of 
the network to identify key individuals and their locations to enable targeted operations. 
It also highlights critical points to employ non-kinetic options. It is important to note that 
in developing this strategy, the metrics and graph on Los Zetas should be utilized 
concurrently; failure to do so can potentially yield a faulty strategy. Another cautionary 
point to consider is that the removal of highly central individuals may only have a 
temporary disruptive effect on the network.187 Los Zetas is a highly dense organization, 
which shows extreme resilience with the ability to replace leadership in a short period of 
time.188 The approach herein employs tactics to affect both members central to the 
organization and on its periphery. Clearly, targeting the organizational structure of Los 
Zetas is crucial in debilitating its operational capacity.  
K. OTHER RECOMMENDED APPROACHES: KINETIC AND NON-
KINETIC 
1. Capacity Building and Targeting 
The current strategy of the government of Mexico focuses on counter-leadership 
targeting; arguably, it has yielded limited results.189 Nevertheless, it is essential that 
targeting at this level continue against Los Zetas’ infrastructure. Complementing this 
effort should include the targeting of Los Zetas’ white-collar support infrastructure. The 
lawyers, accountants, and politicians who work for Los Zetas must be targeted with the 
same intensity as the leadership. This method will significantly degrade the organization 
by targeting members who have specialized skills and are not easily replaced. 
                                                 
187 Sean F. Everton, “Network Topography, Key Players and Terrorist Networks,” (paper presented at 
the annual conference of the Association for the Study of Economics, Religion and Culture in Washington, 
DC, 2009), 1. 
188 “Mexico-U.S.: Has Targeting Top Cartel Bosses Been Effective?” 
http://www.latinnews.com/latinnewsdaily/item/47662.html?period=2011&archive=26&cat_id=785565%3
Amexico-us-has-targeting-top-cartel-bosses-been-effective%3F. 
189 As cited in George Grayson, “President Felipe Calderon Launches Ambitious Campaign Against 
Drug Cartels,” http://www.allbusiness.com/north-america/mexico/3990914-1.html#ixzz1Zg8XROJD. 
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An improvement to the current strategy is to shift to a simultaneous approach. 
This strategy requires an increase in security capacity. The United States can support the 
capacity building efforts by providing training and logistics to facilitate the execution of 
multiple targets. Additional support may consist of providing airlift assets, weapons, 
ammunition, etc. Unfortunately, U.S. trainers on Mexican soil may not be an accepted 
course of action; therefore, a nontraditional methodology is necessary.  
The Mexican government currently limits the presence of American boots on the 
ground,190 which hinders the ability of U.S. troops to train and provide assistance to 
Mexican forces. Two courses of action may work in this instance. The first consists of 
bringing Mexican troops into the United States to receive the necessary training and 
increase its operational size.191 The second involves the use of a partner force that can 
operate in Mexico without the restrictions imposed on American forces. Recently, the 
Colombian National police have trained the Mexican police in country.192 Potentially, 
Colombian forces can continue to expand their role as trainers in Mexico. 
2. Extradition and Mexican Laws 
Currently, the U.S. and Mexican governments have a formal extradition treaty.193 
Unfortunately, the process is too lethargic. For example, it took four years to extradite the 
former leader of the Gulf Cartel.194 The current extradition process limits access to 
                                                 
190 Eduardo Castillo and Martha Mendoza, “Drones, Bugs and Boots on the Ground: U.S. Law 
Enforcement Widens Its Role in Mexico Drug War,” The Associated Press, 
http://www.news1130.com/news/world/article/199936--drones-bugs-and-boots-on-the-ground-us-law-
enforcement-widens-its-role-in-mexico-drug-war. 
191 Military exchange programs are being conducted worldwide. The percentage of those soldiers 
(known) who choose to join criminal organizations or illegitimate groups is insignificant as compared to 
those who go on and do great things for their military and country.  
192 Juan Forrero, “Colombia Stepping Up Anti-Drug Training of Mexico's Army, Police,” 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012106325.html. 
193 United States and Mexico: Extradition Treaty with Appendix. No. 19462 signed at Mexico City, 
May 4, 1978, untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/5/34/00009695.pdf. 
194 “Why Extraditing Mexico Drug Traffickers Could Strengthen Drug Gangs,” Insight Crime, 
http://internationalextraditionblog.com/2011/08/19/why-extraditing-mexico-drug-traffickers-could-
strengthen-us-gangs/. 
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current intelligence and reduces the effectiveness of the operations. The authors’ 
recommendation is to amend the current extradition agreements to expedite the process.  
An important aspect of the Mexican judicial system is the absence of a plea 
bargain,195 which denies the detainee any incentives to negotiate and provide information 
on the organization. Nevertheless, by expediting extradition into the United States, 
negotiations can proceed under different laws and actionable intelligence can be obtained. 
Another significant factor of the Mexican judicial system is the absence of capital 
punishment.196 At a minimum, those individuals associated with crime against humanity 
(mass graves, sensational crimes) should receive capital punishment. Implementing 
capital punishment may serve as deterrence for Los Zetas’ recruitment efforts. 
3. Penetration of the Organization 
Los Zetas’ approach to criminal activities displays innovation and adaptability.197 
The same approach must be taken to defeat them. A strategy to penetrate the organization 
can significantly degrade its criminal capacity. The first method to penetrate Los Zetas’ 
organizational infrastructure is to ideologically turn selected detainees against the 
organization and allow them to return before their position is compromised. Once turned, 
authorities must ensure that individuals remain under their control and are willing to 
attend rehabilitation. Every effort should be made to exploit their access to the 
organization. Similarly, once they furnish the targetable information, substantial effort 
should be made to rehabilitate them. Ideally, this method is used against financiers and 
logisticians since these individuals have access to other members of the network and can 
easily be persuaded with rewards. 
The second method follows directly from the arrests of financiers and logisticians. 
Targeting financiers and seizing large sums of money should weaken the network 
                                                 
195 “Restorative Justice Warmly Received in Mexico,” ADR Report (VORP), 
http://vorp.com/articles/mexico01.html. 
196 Marion Lloyd, “Mexico: Death Penalty Gaining Support,” Global Post.com, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/14/mexico-death-penalty-gain_n_157868.html.  
197 AbigailCatherine, “Human and Drug Trafficking,” TalkingDrugs, 
http://www.talkingdrugs.org/human-trafficking-fuelled-by. 
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significantly, and drive Los Zetas to increase already established relationships with 
corrupt police and politicians to protect its assets and the use of intelligence gathering.198 
In turn, this greater demand for corrupt officials and information on law enforcement 
operations will make Los Zetas vulnerable to penetration. By using a reversed penetration 
methodology, law enforcement agents can gain access to the organization.  
Lastly, the Mexican military and police institutions experience a high number of 
desertions,199 which creates an attractive pool of potential recruits for Los Zetas. More 
importantly, it provides another venue for penetrating the organization. The intent is to 
mold an intruder with the necessary attractive skills to infiltrate Los Zetas.  
4. Counter Perception Operations 
A more subtle approach entails the disruption of the Los Zetas’ image. Currently, 
Los Zetas enjoys an overwhelming glorification of its criminal image as a group. It is not 
uncommon for young male adults to identify themselves with Los Zetas. Unfortunately, 
this greater-than-life image projection provides Los Zetas with a recruitment advantage. 
The authors contend that the distortion of Los Zetas’ image can have a diminishing effect 
of its recruitment ability. One possible strategy to distort its image consists of 
empowering a few of the many emerging vigilante groups. These groups enjoy the local 
support of the population and have unlimited access to specific areas. Arguably, vigilante 
groups can benefit from military organization and material resources to fight off Los 
Zetas’ presence within their local areas. By organizing and equipping these groups, the 
law enforcement effort generates force multipliers to deny Los Zetas space and safe 
havens.  
Second, having a smaller group deliver a striking blow against the network may 
generate a significant psychological impact against Los Zetas. Essentially, the group has 
to appear significantly weaker than the more intimidating Los Zetas to create a “David 
                                                 
198 Sam Logan, “Los Zetas: Evolution of a Criminal Organization,” 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch-Archive/Detail/?id=97554. 
199 Rodriguez Rey, “Army Desertions Hurting Mexico’s War on Drugs,” http://articles.cnn.com/2009-
03-11/world/mexico.desertions-drug-cartels. 
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versus Goliath” effect. This action must be followed by an extensive information 
operations campaign. In the end, the intent is to replace the strong image of Los Zetas 
with a much weaker and fragile one, as well as to construct the message to persuade the 
population that submission to Los Zetas control is not the only available option.200  
5. Improving Intelligence Fusion 
Los Zetas operational tentacles reach several countries in Central America, South 
America, and the United States.201 To optimize the disruption strategy, a more extensive 
intelligence fusion effort is necessary. Increased collaboration among international law 
enforcement entities will furnish the required actionable intelligence flow between those 
elements interested in disrupting the organization.  
The recommendation is to provide a cyber-platform to allow key law enforcement 
and state security agencies in the different countries affected by Los Zetas’ presence and 
optimize the sharing of information. For example, the use of an intelligence-based 
Facebook page can connect national law enforcement entities in El Salvador with a task 
force in the United States.202 This platform will enable intelligence fusion by sharing 
information of recent operations against the network.  
L. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The study presented in thesis only scratches the surface of Los Zetas and provides 
a snapshot in time of this criminal organization. Significant time constraints led to the 
narrowing of the focus on Los Zetas’ activities in Mexico. To deepen the understanding 
of this criminal enterprise, research must expand outside Mexico’s boundaries. Los Zetas 
has both regional and international ties in several countries, such as Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Belize, Colombia and the United States. Los Zetas has also 
                                                 
200 Doowan Lee, Class Discussion and Notes from DA 3800 Theory and Practice of Social 
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expanded its market reach into Western Africa and Europe by establishing strong 
contacts with Italian criminal organizations.203 Unquestionably, the employment of SNA 
and geospatial and temporal analysis as discussed will continue to be indispensable tools 
in further exploring Los Zetas. 
M. SUMMARY 
Arguably, Los Zetas demonstrates unmatched resiliency against current law 
enforcement efforts. A multi-disciplinary approach is needed to understand Los Zetas and 
develop an efficient disruption strategy. The analyses of Los Zetas financial practices 
reveal vulnerabilities that contribute to an enduring disruption strategy against them. The 
geospatial and temporal study identifies targetable opportunities in key terrain essential 
for Los Zetas to generate funds, while SNA illuminates weaknesses in the organizational 
structure of Los Zetas. In the end, attacking Los Zetas through multiple venues presented 
in this research may potentially lead to the organization’s collapse. 
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